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Abstract
A computational system is called autonomous if it is able to make its own decisions, or take its own
actions, without human supervision or control. The capability and spread of such systems have reached
the point where they are beginning to touch much of everyday life. However, regulators grapple with
how to deal with autonomous systems, for example how could we certify an Unmanned Aerial System
for autonomous use in civilian airspace? We here analyse what is needed in order to provide verified re-
liable behaviour of an autonomous system, analyse what can be done as the state-of-the-art in automated
verification, and propose a roadmap towards developing regulatory guidelines, including articulating chal-
lenges to researchers, to engineers, and to regulators. Case studies in seven distinct domains illustrate the
article.
Keywords: autonomous systems; certification; verification; Artificial Intelligence
1 Introduction
Since the dawn of human history, humans have designed, implemented and adopted tools to
make it easier to perform tasks, often improving efficiency, safety, or security. Indeed, recent
studies show a direct relationship between increasing technological complexity, cognitive evo-
lution and cultural variation [211].
When such tools were simple, the person using the tool had full control over the way the tool
should be operated, understood why it worked in that way, knew how the tool should be used to
comply with existing rules, and when such rules might be broken if the situation demanded an
exceptional use of the tool. For example, our early ancestors could use a hammer for building
artefacts, knew why the hammer could be used for their purposes, followed the rules of not using
it as a weapon against other humans, but might have chosen to break this rule if their families
were in danger (Figure 1).
Fig. 1: Human user has the full control of the tool.
However, as tools became more complex and developed into systems composed of many
different parts, users lost their broad view on how the system, or even some of its components,
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worked and – without that know-how – they lost part of their control over the system. But users
still retained the capability of using systems following the rules, and breaking the rules if needed.
By delegating the control of some basic tasks to the system itself, users gained in efficiency at
the expense of exhaustive control (Figure 2).
Fig. 2: Human (partially) delegates the control of the operations.
Nowadays, the sophisticated systems that we rely on have become so complex that our
awareness of what actually happens when we exploit some of their functionality is often close to
zero. For example, how many people know how a cloud storage system works? Or the complex
link between a vehicle’s brake pedal and the vehicle speed? Even if we are domain experts, we
barely know the complete event/data flow initiated by just pressing one button. This is even more
true with the rise of auto-* and self-* systems (auto-pilots, self-driving cars, self-configuring in-
dustrial equipment, etc). We therefore can no longer just delegate the control of basic operations.
If we want a car to drive by itself, we must also delegate to it the requirement to follow the road
traffic rules (Figure 3).
Fig. 3: Human (partially) delegates the respect of the rules.
So far, however, a self-driving car is neither designed nor expected to make decisions in
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Fig. 4: Human replaced by an autonomous software system.
moral-ethical situations [31]. When ethics, and even merely outside-of-scope situations, bear
upon autonomous operation, the human must still be responsible [226]. As an example, if a
self-driving car has a mechanical/software failure in a dangerous situation or if it encounters a
safety dilemma, responsibility is transferred to the human.
Nevertheless, due to the delegation of more and more capabilities from humans to machines,
the scenario depicted in Figure 4 – where the human is replaced by an autonomous system –
is becoming more realistic. This scenario of full autonomy raises many ethical, legal, social,
methodological and technical issues. In this article we address the crucial question: “How can
the reliability of such an autonomous software system be certified?”
1.1 Terminology
Before exploring this challenging question, we need to define the terminology used in the sequel.
By ‘we’ this article means the authors. When we want to indicate some more general class of
individuals, such as ‘the scientific community’, or ‘humankind’, we will explicitly use those
terms.
We start with reliability. The term ‘reliable’ means ‘suitable or fit to be relied on’ [170].
For systems offering a service or function, reliability means that the service or function is avail-
able when needed. A software system is reliable to the extent that it meets its requirements
consistently, namely that it makes good decisions in all situations. In some situations, a good
decision is simply one that follows given rules, for instance, choosing to stop at a red traffic
light. However, in other, hopefully rare situations, rules may need to be overridden, for instance,
temporarily driving on the wrong side of the road to avoid a crash.
Answering the question of what a ‘good’ decision is out of the scope of this paper. Ethical
decision making has been widely studied by psychologists and philosophers such as Lawrence
Kohlberg who developed the theory of stages of moral development [152, 153, 154], and differ-
ent cultures have a different attitude towards the notion of ‘good’ decision. Our contribution is
not on the philosophical challenges raised by the question, but on the technological ones.
Reliability is often associated with the notion of a certification, ‘a proof or a document
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proving that someone is qualified for a particular job, or that something is of good quality’
[45]; besides the document, certification also refers to ‘the process of giving official or legal
approval to a person, company, product, etc., that has reached a particular standard’ [46]. Human
professionals can be certified, and the idea is not new: guilds of arts and crafts were born in the
12th century in many European cities, to regulate and protect the activities of those belonging to
the same professional category [148]. Being part of a guild was a certification of the craftman’s
or merchant’s professional skills. As soon as machines partially or completely supplemented
professionals, the need to certify machines arose – at least in terms of safety, if not functionality;
this is also true of software. Certification of software reliability is a lively research area in
software engineering, as will be discussed in Section 2.2.
We define a system to be autonomous if it can make its own decisions and act on them, with-
out external (human) supervision and control. For example, a mobile robot can be completely
remote-controlled, in which case it is not autonomous, or it can have a built-in control unit that
decides on its moves, such that it becomes semi-autonomous. Of course, the boundary sepa-
rating fully autonomous from non-autonomous systems is not black and white. For example,
the robot may be allowed some degree of autonomy, e.g., in path planning, whereas the overall
movement goal is imposed by some remote controller.
Definition 1: The levels of autonomy that we will use to classify examples of systems from
different domains in Section 4, roughly follow the six-grade scale given for autonomous road
vehicles by SAE International [203], though, e.g., that standard does not include our ‘low’ layer:
• No autonomy: The operator is responsible for all tasks.
• Low autonomy: Straightforward (but non-trivial) tasks are done entirely autonomously
(no human poised to take over operation).
• Assistance systems: The operator is assisted by automated systems, but either remains in
control to some extent or must be ready to take back control at any time.
• Partial autonomy: The automated system takes full control of the system, but the opera-
tor must remain engaged, monitor the operation and be prepared to intervene immediately.
• Conditional autonomy: The automated system has full control of the operation during
specified tasks; the operator can safely turn their attention away but must still be prepared
to intervene upon request.
• High autonomy: The automated system is capable of performing all planned functions
under certain circumstances (e.g., within a certain area); the operator may safely leave the
system alone.
• Full autonomy: The system can perform all its intended tasks on its own, no human
intervention is required at any time.
In addition to defining the level of autonomy, we also consider the scope of autonomy. This
is the level of functionality of the system’s autonomous capabilities. For example, one vacuum
1 Introduction 6
cleaner might have autonomous capabilities that only encompass traversing a space and avoiding
obstacles, while another, more sophisticated model, may also be able to schedule its cleaning
to avoid disruption to the human’s schedule. We would say that the second model has greater
scope of autonomy. The scope and level of autonomy can sometimes be a tradeoff: increasing
the scope may involve the system doing things that it cannot do fully autonomously, whereas a
system with more limited scope may be able to have higher autonomy.
We are particularly interested in fully autonomous systems that can also make their own
decisions on safety-critical actions, namely actions whose failure could result in loss of life,
significant property damage or damage to the environment.1 Additionally, autonomous systems
are often characterised by the need to balance pursuing objectives over a long time period (being
proactive), with responding to environmental and system changes (being reactive).
In the sequel, we will also make strong use of the notion of an ‘agent’. An autonomous
software agent (‘agent’ for short) is an autonomous software system that captures the ability
to decide or act independently, while also balancing between being proactive and reactive. We
follow standard usage in the field in defining a multiagent system as a system that includes
multiple such agents, which may interact in various ways (e.g., communicating using messages
or via the environment): see the seminal works by Jennings N. R., Sycara K. P., and Wooldridge
M. [147, 231, 232]. Finally, we consider rational agents as those that are structured in terms of
intentional concepts, such as goals, beliefs, and intentions (synonymously, the terms ‘cognitive
agent’ or ‘intelligent agent’ are sometimes used in the literature [232]).
Figure 5 compares different domains of autonomous systems in terms of the expected au-
tonomy and available regulation. Although the scope2 of (expected) autonomy and the level of
regulation cannot be measured precisely, the figure highlights that there are systems (top left
quadrant) with considerable scope for autonomy, but limited available regulation. These are the
sorts of systems that particularly require work to be able to shift them across to the right by
increasing the available regulation. We discuss each of these domains in Section 4, with the ex-
ception of remote surgical robots, since there is not enough autonomy permitted to such systems.
It is worth noting that although many systems can be viewed as being rational agents, we only
do so when there is benefit in adopting an intentional stance and viewing the system in these
terms. For example, a thermostat makes decisions, and we could ascribe it a goal to keep the
room at a fixed temperature. However, the behaviour of a thermostat is simple enough that there
is no benefit to viewing it in terms of goals and beliefs [58].
It is important to highlight that, for purposes of certification, or other regulatory procedures,
we sometimes need to consider not just what a software system did, but also why it did it. For
instance, there is a difference between a car breaking the speed limit because it has an incorrect
belief about the speed limit, and a car going too fast because it believes that temporarily speeding
is the best, or even the only, way to avoid an accident.3
1 Adapted from the definition of ‘Safety Critical System’ provided by J. C. Knight in [151].
2 We use the scope of autonomy in this figure, rather than the level of autonomy, because for the systems considered
there is a tradeoff: the systems vary in the scope of autonomy, but for many of these systems the scope is set (by
designers) in order to allow the system to display high levels of autonomy, making scope of autonomy a more useful
differentiator than the level of autonomy.
3 Here we see the interplay between norms of different types [57]: current jurisdiction in Germany at the time of
writing is that one is not allowed to transgress speed limits even in life-threatening situations. The argument is that
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Fig. 5: Comparing domains of autonomous systems in terms of the level of autonomy expected
in the (near) future, and the amount of regulation existing today. Note that the level of
(expected) autonomy and of existing regulation cannot be precisely measured on a scale.
This figure should be interpreted as being roughly indicative.
1.2 Audience, Contributions and Structure
This article assesses what is needed in order to provide verified reliable behaviour of an au-
tonomous system, analyses what can be done as the state of the art in automated verification,
and proposes a roadmap towards developing certification and broader regulation guidelines.
This article thus has three audiences. Firstly, we address regulators, who might find the
proposed roadmap useful as a path towards being able to meaningfully regulate these sorts of
systems. Secondly, engineers and developers who develop such systems might find it useful in
seeing how/where these systems need greater analysis. Thirdly, academic researchers can ad-
vance the state of the art by finding better ways of dealing with the challenges that we articulate.
We advance the literature by
1. proposing a framework for viewing (and indeed building) autonomous systems in terms
of three layers;
2. showing that this framework is general, by illustrating its application to a range of systems,
in a range of domains;
3. discussing how certification/regulation might be achieved, breaking it down by the three
even in order to save a human life one is not supposed to endanger another one.
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layers; and
4. articulating a range of challenges and future work, including challenges to regulators, to
researchers, and to developers.
The remainder of the article is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the current situation
in terms of regulation and certification of (semi-)autonomous systems, and of the issues still
open. Section 3 assesses what could be done in the near future; it develops our three-layer
reference framework, discusses what we need from regulators, proposes a process for deriving
verification properties, and reviews in more detail verificaton techniques. Section 4 discusses a
set of case studies in different application domains. Section 5 looks at challenges in research,
engineering and regulation. Section 6 summarises and indicates future directions.
2 Looking Back
All systems, be they autonomous or not, that operate in a human society need to conform to
some legal requirements. These legal requirements may be generic and apply to all products,
or specific. Often these requirements are based on regulations, that we define as ‘rules, policies
and laws set out by some acknowledged authority to ensure the safe design and operation of
systems’.4
Relating to the concept of regulation, in the context of this paper certification can be specified
as ‘the determination by an independent body that checks whether the systems are in conformity
or compliant with the above regulations’. Certification involves a legal, rather than scientific,
assessment and usually appeals to external review, typically by some regulator.
The certification processes, and hence regulators, in turn appeal to standards, namely docu-
ments (usually produced by a panel of experts) providing guidance on the proving of compliance.
There are a plethora of different standards, issued by a wide range of different standardisa-
tion organisations. Amongst the most well known are CENELEC [69], IEC [117], IEEE [101]
and ISO [126], to name just a few. Many of these organisations provide generic standards rele-
vant across many (autonomous) system domains. For particular sectors, the regulatory bodies –
and there may be several for each sector – have a range of specific standards. In Section 2.1 we
present some of the most relevant existing standards, and in Section 2.2 we overview some meth-
ods and tools suitable for certification of software systems. It is important to note, however, that
nowadays moving from written standards to formal specifications that can be fed to tools able to
check, verify, and certify the system’s behaviour, is not possible. Also, most existing standards
say little, if anything, about ‘autonomy’ and ‘uncertainty’, the situation where autonomy is more
needed, but also more dangerous. Nevertheless, they prescribe important properties that systems
should aim to comply with. Section 2.3 faces some issues raised by autonomous systems, which
are not (yet) satisfactorily addressed by current standards and regulations, including how we
might link together the achievements described in the first two sections, and how we might deal
with autonomy and uncertainty.
4 The definition provided by the Cambridge Dictionary is ‘the rules or systems that are used by a person or
organisation to control an activity or process’ [47]. We customise this definition for systems that may perform safety-
critical actions.
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Tab. 1: Examples of standards for robotics.
Code Title Year Abstract
ISO
13482
[134]
Robots and robotic devices –
Safety requirements for per-
sonal care robots
2014 Requirements and guidelines for the inherently safe design, protective
measures, and information for use of personal care robots, in particular
mobile servant robot; physical assistant robot; person carrier robot.
IEEE
1872
[103]
IEEE Standard Ontologies
for Robotics and Automa-
tion
2015 A core ontology that specifies the main, most general concepts, rela-
tions, and axioms of robotics and automation, intended as a reference
for knowledge representation and reasoning in robots.
ISO/TS
15066
[141]
Robots and robotic devices –
Collaborative robots
2016 Safety requirements for collaborative industrial robot systems and the
work environment, supplementing the requirements and guidance on
collaborative industrial robot operation given in ISO 10218-1 and ISO
10218-2.
ISO/TR
20218-1,
ISO/TR
20218-2
[144,
142]
Robotics – Safety design for
industrial robot systems –
Part 1 (End-effectors) & Part
2 (Manual load/unload sta-
tions)
2017,
2018
Applicable to robot systems for manual load/unload applications in
which a hazard zone is safeguarded by preventing access to it, and both
access restrictions to hazard zones and ergonomically suitable work
places must be considered. Guidance on safety measures for the de-
sign and integration of end-effectors used for robot systems.
ISO/TR
23482-2
[143]
Robotics – Application of
ISO 13482 – Part 2: Appli-
cation guidelines
2019 Guidance on the use of ISO 13482 to facilitate the design of personal
care robots in conformity with ISO 13482, including new terms and
safety requirements introduced to allow close human-robot interaction
and human-robot contact in personal care robot applications.
2.1 Standards
Tables 1 to 5 present some standards grouped by domains where autonomy potentially plays
a crucial role. The most sophisticated illustrative examples in Section 4 are taken from these
domains. We do not claim this to be either exhaustive or systematic: this section is only meant
to give the reader an idea of the complexity and wide variety of existing standards by providing
examples issued by different organisations. It is important to note that there is a vast array of
standards, many of which are never used by any regulator.
Table 1 illustrates some standards in the robotics domain. Most of them come from ISO.
A Technical Committee of the ISO created in 2015 [135] is in charge of the standardisation of
different robotics fields, excluding toys and military applications. In 2015, IEEE developed an
ontology for agreeing on a shared terminology in robotics, and delivered it as a standard.
Table 2 summarises some facts of one IEC standard dealing with medical equipment. Many
standards in this domain exist, also delivered by ISO which issued more than 400 standards
focusing on health [139] thanks to three Technical Committees dealing with medical equipment
[128, 129, 130] and one dealing with health informatics [131]. We selected [124] as an example
from the medical technologies domain, because it focusses on equipments with ‘a degree of
autonomy’.
Nearly 900 ISO standards have been developed for the automotive sector [136]. One of
the influential is the ISO 26262 [138], born as an adaptation of the Functional Safety standard
IEC 61508 for Automotive Electric/Electronic Systems [119]. Published in 12 individual parts,
ISO 26262 has been updated in 2018 to keep abreast of today’s new and rapidly evolving tech-
nologies, and be relevant to even more applications. IEEE is also developing standards in the
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Tab. 2: Examples of standards for medical-assistive technologies
Code Title Year Abstract
IEC/TR
60601-
4-1
[124]
Medical electrical equip-
ment – Part 4-1: Guidance
and interpretation
2017 Guidance to a detailed risk management and usability engineering pro-
cesses for medical electrical equipment (MEE) or a medical electrical
system (MES), employing a degree of autonomy (DOA) & guidance on
considerations of basic safety and essential performance for an MEE
and MES with a DOA.
Tab. 3: Examples of standards in the automotive domain
Code Title Year Abstract
IEEE-
P2020
[104]
Standard for Automotive
System Image Quality
2016 This standard addresses the fundamental attributes that contribute to im-
age and quality for automotive Advanced Driver Assistance Systems
applications, as well as identifying existing metrics and other useful in-
formation relating to these attributes.
ISO
26262
[138]
Road vehicles – Functional
safety
2018 Safety is one of the key issues in the development of road vehicles.
With the trend of increasing technological complexity, software content
and mechatronic implementation, there are increasing risks from sys-
tematic failures and random hardware failures, these being considered
within the scope of functional safety. The ISO 26262 series of stan-
dards includes guidance to mitigate these risks by providing appropriate
requirements and processes.
IEC
63243
ED1
[125]
Interoperability and safety
of dynamic wireless power
transfer (WPT) for electric
vehicles
2019 The draft of this standard, develped by the IEC TC 69, will be circulated
at the end of 2019. It will specify definition and conditions of interoper-
ability and safety for magnetic-field dynamic WPT for electric vehicles
and the associated safety requirements.
automotive sector, ranging from public safety in transportation-related events [102] to system
image quality [104]. More than three dozen IEC technical committees and subcommittees cover
the standardisation of equipment used in and related to road vehicles as well as of other associ-
ated issues. As an example, the IEC TC 69 [122] is preparing international standards for road
vehicles, totally or partly electrically propelled from self-contained power sources, and for elec-
tric industrial trucks. Table 3 presents one standard for each of the three organisations above,
ISO, IEEE, and IEC.
Compared to other domains, railway homologation and operation is strictly regulated. The
IEC Technical Committee 9 [123] is responsible for the international standardisation of the
electrical equipment and systems used in railways. The ISO Technical Committee 269 [133]
complements IEC TC 9 by addressing the standardisation of all systems, products and services
specifically related to the railway sector, not already covered by IEC TC 9. Both work in close
relationship with the International Union of Railways (UIC, [145]) and the International Asso-
ciation of Public Transport (UITP, [113]). Through the CENELEC 50128 standard [48], CEN-
ELEC assesses the conformity of software for use in railway control which may have impact on
safety, i.e., software whose failures can affect safety functions. Table 4 exemplifies standards in
the railway sector by presenting one standard from ISO dealing with project management, one
series from IEC dealing with reliability, availability, maintainability and safety, and the CEN-
ELEC 50128 standard.
The quantity of existing standards in the aerospace domain is huge. Established in 1947,
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Tab. 4: Examples of standards in the railway domain
Code Title Year Abstract
IEC
62278
series
[118, 120,
121]
Railway applications –
Specification and demon-
stration of reliability,
availability, maintainability
and safety (RAMS)
2002,
2010,
2016
The documents under the IEC 62278 umbrella provide Railway Au-
thorities and railway support industry with a process which will enable
the implementation of a consistent approach to the management of
reliability, availability, maintainability and safety (RAMS). The pro-
cess can be applied systematically by a Railway Authority and railway
support industry, throughout all phases of the life cycle of a railway
application, to develop railway specific RAMS requirements and to
achieve compliance with these requirements.
CENELEC
50128
[48]
Railway applications –
Communication, signalling
and processing systems –
Software for railway control
and protection systems
2011 Specification of the process and technical requirements for the devel-
opment of software for programmable electronic systems for use in
railway control and protection applications, aimed at use in any area
where there are safety implications.
ISO/TR
21245
[137]
Railway applications – Rail-
way project planning pro-
cess – Guidance on railway
project planning
2018 Guidance on railway project planning for decision making, based
upon the principles of ISO 21500 [132], by incorporating characteris-
tics specific to railway projects. The document is meant to be used by
any type of organisation and be applied to any type of railway project,
irrespective of its complexity, size, duration. It provides neither de-
tailed requirements nor specific processes for certification.
ISO/TC 20 [127] is one of the oldest and most prolific ISO technical committees. IEEE has
published nearly 60 standards dealing with aerospace electronics, and IEC has two Technical
Committees dealing with avionics-related issues [116, 115]: these committees developed about
30 standards. Other relevant standards bodies must be mentioned as well. The mission of the
European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA, [71]) is to ensure the highest common level
of safety protection for EU citizens and of environmental protection; to provide a single regu-
latory and certification process among Member States; to facilitate the internal aviation single
market and create a level playing field; and to work with other international aviation organi-
sations and regulators. The US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA, [75]) summarises its
mission as ‘to provide the safest, most efficient aerospace system in the world’. Finally, the US
Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA, [188]) aims at being ‘the premier Public-
Private Partnership venue for developing consensus among diverse and competing interests on
resolutions critical to aviation modernisation issues in an increasingly global enterprise’. In Ta-
ble 5 we present standards from EASA, FAA, and RTCA, including two standards dealing with
Unmanned Aircraft Systems and drones.
Having reviewed relevant standards in various domains, we next turn to briefly reviewing tech-
niques for certification of software systems.
2.2 Certification of Traditional Software Systems
In the late 1980s, with software applications becoming more and more pervasive and safety-
critical, many scientists began to address the problem of certifying them. One of the first papers
in this research strand was ‘Certifying the Reliability of Software’ [54]. It proposed a certifi-
cation procedure consisting of executable product increments, representative statistical testing,
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Tab. 5: Examples of standards for the aerospace sector
Code Title Year Abstract
RTCA DO-
254 [191]
Design Assurance Guidance
for Airborne Electronic
Hardware
2000 This document is intended to help aircraft manufacturers and the
suppliers of aircraft electronic systems assure that electronic air-
borne equipment safely performs its intended function. The docu-
ment also characterises the objective of the design life cycle pro-
cesses and offers a means of complying with certification require-
ments.
RTCA DO-
333 [192]
Formal Methods Supple-
ment to DO-178C and
DO-278A
2011 Additions, modifications and substitutions to DO-178C (see below)
and DO-278A [190] objectives when formal methods are used as
part of a software life cycle, and the additional guidance required.
It discusses those aspects of airworthiness certification that pertain
to the production of software, using formal methods for systems
approved using DO-178C.
RTCA DO-
178B, DO-
178C/ED-
12C
[189, 193]
Software Considerations
in Airborne Systems and
Equipment Certification
2012 Recommendations for the production of software for airborne sys-
tems and equipment that performs its intended function with a level
of confidence in safety that complies with airworthiness require-
ments. Compliance with the objectives of DO-178C is the primary
means of obtaining approval of software used in civil aviation prod-
ucts.
FAA Part
107 [77]
Operation and Certification
of Small Unmanned Aircraft
Systems
2016 Addition of a new part 107 to Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations
[76] to allow for routine civil operation of small Unmanned Air-
craft Systems (UAS) in the National Airspace System and to pro-
vide safety rules for those operations. The rule limits small UAS
to daylight and civil twilight operations with appropriate collision
lighting, confined areas of operation, and visual-line-of-sight oper-
ations.
Regulation
(EU)
2018/1139
[214]
Regulation (EU) 2018/1139
of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 4 July
2018
2018 First EU-wide regulations for civil drones with a strong focus on the
particular risk of the operations. The regulations take into account
the expertise of many international players in the drone domain;
they will allow remotely piloted aircraft to fly safely in European
airspace and bring legal certainty for this rapidly expanding indus-
try.
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and a standard estimate of the mean time to failure of the system product at the time it was
released. Subsequently, Wohlin C. and Runeson P. presented a more mature method of certifica-
tion, consisting of five steps, and suitable for certification of both components and full systems:
1) Modelling of software usage, 2) derivation of usage profile, 3) generation of test cases, 4) exe-
cution of test cases and collection of failure data, and 5) certification of reliability and prediction
of future reliability [229]. Further, Poore J. H., Mills H. D., and Mutchler D. also pointed out
that certification should be based on first generating inputs according to the system’s intended
use, and then conducting statistical experiments to analyse them. The idea that ‘if a component
has been verified by a mathematical proof of correctness, you may be able to attribute a high
degree of reliability to it’ was explicitly stated there [186]. This paved the way to works where
the software certification of safety-critical systems was based on formal methods. It is worth
noting that the already mentioned IEC 61508 standard [119] recommends that formal methods
be used in software design and development in all but the lowest Safety Integrity Levels.
Among this wide range of work, we mention those by Heitmeyer C. L. et al. [91, 92], where
certification is achieved by annotating the code with preconditions and postconditions, exploiting
a five-step process for establishing the property to be verified, and finally demonstrating that the
code satisfies the property. In contrast to previous work by Benzel T. [26] and by Whitehurst
R. A. and Lunt T. F. [26, 225] in the operating systems and database domains, Heitmeyer C. L.
et al. addressed the problem of making the verification of security-critical code affordable.
Many mature formal and semi-formal techniques are widely used to certify software: model
checking, theorem proving, static analysis, runtime verification, and software testing. While
these techniques are consolidated and are indeed met while looking back, we discuss them in
Section 3.4 where we present our vision of the future. The reason is that their adoption is crucial
for certifying systems that are autonomous. Besides introducing them, in Section 3.4 we com-
pare them along the five dimensions of inputs, outputs, strengths, weaknesses, and applicability
with respect to our reference three-layer framework presented in Section 3.1.
As observed in surveys (e.g., [4, 52]), other approaches to software certification have been
exploited, besides (semi-)formal methods. Among them, ‘assurance cases’ were proposed as a
viable way to certify safety-critical applications [196].
An assurance case is an organised argument that a system is acceptable for its in-
tended use with respect to specified concerns (such as safety, security, correctness).
(author?) [196]. analysed 82 works published between 1994 and 2016, concluding that trans-
portation, energy, medicine, and military applications are the areas where assurance cases are
more widely applied.
The adoption of assurance cases is rapidly spreading both in academic works and in industry:
in their recent work [59], Denney E. and Pai G. present the AdvoCATE toolset for assurance
case automation developed by NASA, and overview more than twenty research and commercial
tools suitable for creating structured safety arguments using Claims-Argument-Evidence (CAE)
notation [32], and/or Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) diagrams [209].
As a final remark, we observe that software certification is so challenging that the adoption
of the same method or tool across different domains is often impossible. Hence, many domain-
dependent proposals exist such as for robotics [180], medical systems [13], the automotive sector
[14, 236], unmanned aircraft [218, 224], and railway systems [65].
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2.3 Open Issues in the Certification of Autonomous Systems
Current standards and regulations are not ready for coping with autonomous systems that may
raise safety issues, and hence need to undergo a formal process to be certified. One main issue
in their adoption is the format in which standards are currently specified: textual descriptions
in natural language. The second issue is the lack of consideration, and sometimes even of clear
understanding, of the ‘autonomy’ and ‘uncertainty’ notions. Sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 discuss
these two issues, respectively.
2.3.1 Certifying Systems against Textual Descriptions and System Runs
Let us suppose that the approach followed for the certification process is based on verification.
Verifying – either statically or dynamically – scientific and technical requirements of complex
and autonomous software applications is far from being an easy task but, at least, formalisms,
methodologies and tools for representing and processing such requirements have been studied,
designed and implemented for years, within the formal methods and software engineering com-
munities.
When requirements have a legal or even ethical connotation, such as the standards discussed
in Section 2.1, their verification may be harder, if not impossible. Such ‘legal requirements’ are
written in natural language: in order to verify that a system complies with them, a step must be
made to move from the natural language to a formal one.
The literature on this topic is vast, but running existing algorithms on existing standards,
and expecting to get a clean, consistent, complete formal specification ready to be verified, is a
hopeless task. For example, ARSENAL [88] converts natural language requirements to formal
models in SAL [24], a formal language for specifying transition systems in a compositional way,
and in LTL. Although equipped with a powerful analysis framework based on formal methods,
and despite its ability to generate a full formal model directly from text, ARSENAL has docu-
mented limitations when dealing, for example, with different ways to express negation and with
co-locations like ‘write access’. Also, looking at the paper, the rules used to feed ARSENAL
seem to follow a simple and regular pattern, with ‘if’ and ‘when’ conditions clearly defined.
Other works address similar problems in the software engineering research area [56, 187,
237], in the agricultural regulation domain [68], and – up to some extent – in the digital forensics
field [234], but the results are far from being applicable to complex, unstructured, heterogeneous
standard specifications.
Process mining [220] is an emerging discipline aimed at discovering precise and formal
specifications of processes, based on data generated by instances of those processes. It builds
on process model-driven approaches and data mining. There are many ways business processes
can be represented using formal languages. Most of them are inspired by Petri Nets [219], but
there are also proposals for formalisms based on LTL [164], that could be directly used to feed
a model checker or a runtime monitor. However, in order to certify the system, the scientists in
charge for the certification process would need:
1. logs of real executions of the system, to mine a precise representation of its functioning
(namely, a model of the system’s behaviour),
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2. properties that the process must verify, either represented in a logical form or translated
into a logical form from a natural language description, using the techniques presented
above, and
3. a model checker, for checking that the properties are verified by the system’s model.
Even if all the three items above were available, the certification would just state that the ob-
served real executions from which the model was extracted, met the properties. Nothing can be
stated on all the other not yet observed, but still possible runs of the system. The main challenge
raised by this scenario is in fact that, being data-driven, the mined model only covers the already
observed situations. It is an approximate specification of how a system behaves in some normal
operational scenarios meeting the rules, and in some scenarios where rules are broken.
At the current state of the art, certifying large and complex (autonomous) systems agains
standards based on textual descriptions and system runs is out of reach, and not only because of
scientific and technical obstacles: current regulations are indeed not appropriate for autonomous
systems. We note the breadth of (mainly academic) work tackling formal methods for (au-
tonomous) robotic systems [162] and would expect this to impact upon regulation and certifi-
cation in the future, to make them aligned with the developments in the autonomous systems
area.
2.3.2 Dealing with Autonomy and Uncertainty
The standards and regulatory frameworks described in Section 2.1 essentially apply to exist-
ing systems, but lack some aspects we would expect of future, more complex and autonomous
systems. The first issue is uncertainty, the second is autonomy. Let us deal with each in turn.
Uncertainty. Current approaches to certification and regulation often assume that
1. there is a finite set of potential hazards/failures,
2. that these can all be identified beforehand, and
3. that this finite set will not change over the lifetime of the system.
If all the above are true then a risk/mitigation based approach can be used since we know what
problems can occur.
However, as we move to much more complex environments where we cannot predict every
(safety) issue then the above assumptions become problematic. And then, as we provide more AI
components, such as online learning modules, we are not only unsure of what the environment
will look like but also unsure of what behaviours our system will have (since it might have learnt
new ones). All these issues pose severe problems for the current techniques for identifying
hazards/faults, assessing risk/mitigation, and building safety-cases.
In more sophisticated systems, such as a domestic robotic assistant with healthcare and social
responsibilities, improved ways of regulating such systems will likely have to be constructed.
Without such improvements, the existing approaches will impose the above assumptions, stifling
application in all but the most static environments.
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Autonomy. A second issue is that the concept of ‘autonomy’ is not well understood in exist-
ing standards/regulations. The standards mentioned so far regulate the requirements, behaviour,
and development process of complex and sophisticated systems. These systems may show some
degree of autonomy, but that is not their most characterising feature. The standards are neither
driven nor strongly influenced by it. Indeed, the issue of ‘autonomy’ has been conspicuously
absent from most existing standards, as well as the ethical issues that it raises. There are only a
few, very recent exceptions.
In 2016, the British Standards Institution (BSI, [42]) developed standards on ethical aspects
of robotics. The BS 8611 standard provides a guide to the Ethical Design and Application of
Robots and Robotic Systems [43]. As stated in its overview:
BS 8611 gives guidelines for the identification of potential ethical harm arising from
the growing number of robots and autonomous systems being used in everyday life.
The standard also provides additional guidelines to eliminate or reduce the risks
associated with these ethical hazards to an acceptable level. The standard covers
safe design, protective measures and information for the design and application of
robots.
[. . . ]
The new standard builds on existing safety requirements for different types of robots,
covering industrial, personal care and medical.
While the BSI feeds in to ISO standards, the above ethical standard has not yet been adopted by
ISO.
In a large, international initiative, the IEEE, through its Global Initiative on Ethics of Au-
tonomous and Intelligent Systems [100], has begun to develop a range of standards tackling
autonomy, ethical issues, transparency, data privacy, trustworthiness, etc. These standards are
still in their early stages of development; Table 6 provides references to those which are more
closely related to autonomous systems. The year reported in the table is the Project Authorisa-
tion Request (PAR) approval date.
Many efforts in the “ethics of autonomous systems” research field converged in the Ethi-
cally Aligned Design document released in 2019 [215]: the document is the result of an open,
collaborative, and consensus building approach lead by the IEEE Global Initiative. While not
proposing any rigorous standard, it makes recommendations on how to design ‘ethics aware’
so-called ‘autonomous and intelligent systems’ (A/IS), and provides reasoned references to the
IEEE P70** standards and to the literature.
To give an example, one of the eight general principles leading the A/IS design is trans-
parency – the basis of a particular A/IS decision should always be discoverable. The associated
recommendation is as follows.
“A/IS, and especially those with embedded norms, must have a high level of trans-
parency, from traceability in the implementation process, mathematical verifiability
of its reasoning, to honesty in appearance-based signals, and intelligibility of the
systems operation and decisions.” [215, Page 46]
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Tab. 6: Examples of IEEE Standards related with ethics of autonomous systems
Code Title PAR
Appr.
Abstract
IEEE
P7000
[105]
Model Process for Addressing
Ethical Concerns During Sys-
tem Design
2016 Process model by which engineers and technologists can address
ethical consideration throughout the various stages of system initi-
ation, analysis and design.
IEEE
P7001
[106]
Transparency of Autonomous
Systems
2016 This standard describes measurable, testable levels of transparency,
so that autonomous systems can be objectively assessed and levels
of compliance determined.
IEEE
P7002
[107]
Data Privacy Process 2016 Requirements for a systems/software engineering process for pri-
vacy oriented considerations regarding products, services, and sys-
tems utilising employee, customer or other external user’s personal
data.
IEEE
P7003
[108]
Algorithmic Bias Considera-
tions
2017 Specific methodologies to help users certify how they worked to
address and eliminate issues of negative bias in the creation of their
algorithms, where ‘negative bias’ infers the usage of overly subjec-
tive or uniformed data sets or information known to be inconsistent
with legislation or with instances of bias against groups not neces-
sarily protected explicitly by legislation.
IEEE
P7006
[109]
Standard for Personal Data
Artificial Intelligence (AI)
Agent
2017 Technical elements required to create and grant access to a person-
alised Artificial Intelligence (AI) that will comprise inputs, learn-
ing, ethics, rules and values controlled by individuals.
IEEE
P7007
[110]
Ontological Standard for Ethi-
cally Driven Robotics and Au-
tomation Systems
2017 The standard establishes a set of ontologies with different abstrac-
tion levels that contain concepts, definitions and axioms which are
necessary to establish ethically driven methodologies for the design
of Robots and Automation Systems.
IEEE
P7008
[111]
Standard for Ethically Driven
Nudging for Robotic, Intel-
ligent and Autonomous Sys-
tems
2017 ‘Nudges’ as exhibited by robotic, intelligent or autonomous sys-
tems are defined as overt or hidden suggestions or manipulations
designed to influence the behaviour or emotions of a user. This
standard establishes a delineation of typical nudges (currently in
use or that could be created).
IEEE
P7009
[112]
Standard for Fail-Safe Design
of Autonomous and Semi-
Autonomous Systems
2017 Practical, technical baseline of specific methodologies and tools
for the development, implementation, and use of effective fail-safe
mechanisms in autonomous and semi-autonomous systems.
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While this represents a very good starting point towards agreeing on which behaviour an A/IS
should exhibit, certifying that an A/IS has a high level of transparency, based on the recom-
mendation above, is not possible. Moving from well known and clear rules written in natural
language to their formal counterpart is hard, and formalising recommendations is currently out
of reach, as discussed in Section 2.3.1.
3 Ways Forward
What is the way forward? There are a number of elements that we can bring together to address
and support regulatory development. These span across:
• architectural/engineering issues — constructing an autonomous system in such a way that
it is amenable to inspection, analysis, and regulatory approval,
• requirements/specification issues — capturing exactly how we want our system to behave,
and what we expect it to achieve, overcoming the difficulties arising when human-level
rules do not already exist, and
• verification and validation issues — providing a wide range of techniques, across differ-
ent levels of formality, that can be used either broadly across the system, or for specific
aspects.
This second item is particularly important [200]: if we do not know what is expected of the
system, then how can we verify it? In traditional systems, the expected behaviour of the human
component in the overall system, be they a pilot, driver, or operator, is often under-specified.
There is an assumption that any trained driver/pilot/operator will behave professionally, yet this
is never spelled out in any system requirement. Then, when we move to autonomous systems,
where software takes over some or all of the human’s responsibilities, the exact behaviour ex-
pected of the software is also under-specified. Consequently, this leads to a requirement for
greater precision and level of detail that we require from regulatory authorities and standards.
This section presents an outline for a way forward, covering the three elements. Firstly, a key
(novel) feature of the approach proposed is a three-layer framework (Section 3.1) that separates
dealing with rule-compliant behaviour in ‘normal’ situations from dealing with abnormal situa-
tions where it may be appropriate to violate rules. For example, a system might consider driving
on the wrong side of the road if there is an obstacle in its way and it is safe to use the other
lane. Secondly, we consider what we need from regulators (Section 3.2) and define a process
for identifying properties to be verified by considering how humans are licensed and assessed
(Section 3.3). Thirdly, we review existing verification techniques (Section 3.4), including their
strengths, weaknesses, and applicability.
3.1 A Reference Three-Layer Autonomy Framework
In order to distinguish the types of decisions made by autonomous systems, we present a ref-
erence three-level framework5 for autonomy in Figure 6. This brings together previous work
5 We use ‘framework’ rather than ‘architecture’ for two reasons. Firstly, to avoid confusion with an existing (but
different) three layer architecture for robots. Secondly, because this framework may not be realised in terms of a
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on:
1. The separation of high-level control from low-level control in systems architectures.
This is a common trend amongst hybrid systems, especially hybrid control systems, whereby
discrete decision/control is used to make large (and discrete) step changes in the low-level
(continuous) control schemes [82].
2. The identification and separation of different forms of high-level control/reasoning.
Separate high-level control or decision making can capture a wide range of different rea-
soning aspects, most commonly ethics [15, 40] or safety [230]. Many of these high-level
components give rise to governors/arbiters for assessing options or runtime verification
schemes for dynamically monitoring whether the expectations are violated.
3. The verification and validation of such architectures as the basis for autonomous systems
analysis.
Fisher, Dennis, and Webster use the above structuring as the basis for the verification of
autonomous systems [82]. By separating out low-level control and high-level decision
making diverse verification techniques can be used and integrated [74]. In particular, by
capturing the high-level reasoning component as a rational agent, stronger formal verifi-
cation in terms of not just ‘what’ and ‘when’ the system will do something but ‘why’ it
chooses to do it can be carried out, hence addressing the core issue with autonomy [61].
Principles
Rules
Reactions
ExpectationsEnvironment
(Mathematical) 
Envelope of 
operation
(Continuous) 
Model of expected 
environment
(Logical) 
Regulations or 
rules of behaviour
(General) 
Principles and 
priorities 
(Discrete) 
Model of anticipated 
scenarios
Unexpected or
Unanticipatable
Fig. 6: A reference three-layer autonomy framework.
software architecture that follows the same three layers.
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Our reference three-layer autonomy framework consists of:
• REACTIONS LAYER— involving adaptive/reactive control/response aspects essentially
comprised of low-level (feedback) interactions — behaviour is driven by this interacting
with its environment [e.g: ‘autopilot’],
• RULES LAYER— involving specific, symbolically-represented descriptions of required
behaviours — these behaviours are tightly constrained by rules [e.g: ‘rules of the air’],
• PRINCIPLES LAYER— involving high-level, abstract, sometimes philosophical, princi-
ples, often with priorities between them — here specific behaviour is not prescribed but
principles that can be applied to new/unexpected situations are provided [e.g: ‘airman-
ship’].
We here split the high-level reasoning component further, into rule-following decisions and de-
cisions based on principles (such as ethics). We distinguish these in that the former matches the
required rules/regulations that the system should (normally) abide by while the latter is a layer
comprising reasoning processes that are invoked when exceptional/unanticipated situations arise
(and for which there are no prescribed regulations).
The key novelty here is the distinction between the normal operation where rules are fol-
lowed (RULES LAYER), and (unusual) situations where the autonomous agent needs to reason
about whether to violate rules, using, e.g., ethical reasoning (PRINCIPLES LAYER).
3.2 What is Needed from Regulators
Currently, in most countries regulation responsibilities are distributed between legislation, pro-
viding the general framework within which an autonomous system is allowed to operate, and
public authorities, which are responsible for providing detailed rules and to supervise the confor-
mance of systems to these rules. In this paper, we focus on rule-making by regulatory agencies.
That is, we do not discuss legal responsibilities of the designers, producers, owners, and opera-
tors of an autonomous system. We are concerned with behavioural aspects of such systems, and
questions arising for regulatory bodies from the increasing autonomy.
In Section 2.3 we discussed the use of standards for verification, concluding that current ap-
proaches to certification and regulation are not adequate for verification of autonomous systems.
In this section we briefly consider what would be needed from regulators in order to allow the
standards to be used to verify autonomous systems.
A key issue is that current standards are not in a form that is amenable for formalisation and
assessment of software, since they are oriented solely for use by humans. One way in which
regulations are oriented towards humans, and do not readily support regulation of software,
is that regulations are framed declaratively: a collection of statements that require substantial
(human) interpretation. Another is that the regulations implicitly assume, and take for granted,
human capabilities and attitudes. In order to certify autonomous software we need the scope
of regulation to include not just low-level physical operation and sensors, but also higher-level
decision-making. Finally, it would also be desirable for the plethora of relevant standards to
be rationalised and consolidated. Consequently, it may be desirable to develop separate (new)
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standards for the assessment of software systems (e.g., software autopilots). At a high level,
regulations should answer the following questions.
• What does it mean for the system to be reliable/safe? The answer to this question is a
set of specifications, or the union of the following:
– What are the regulations the system must obey? For example, the automated air
traffic control system must always send a resolution to avoid two planes getting too
close to each other whenever this is a possibility.
– What emergent behaviours are expected? For example, the automated air traffic
control system should keep the airspace free of conflicts.
– What would be bad? For example: the assistive robot should never cause harm to
a human; the Therac-256 should never deliver radiation to a patient when it was
not activated by hospital staff; and the automated air traffic control system should
never instruct two planes to collide with each other. These are often assumptions
that can be hard to list. They are also negative regulations, i.e., complying with
these is implicit in the regulations. We need to explicitly state them to enable robust
verification efforts. Certification of autonomous systems goes in two directions: we
need to know both that the system does what we want and that the system does not
do what we do not want. This is particularly important for autonomous systems
since the ‘obvious’ things that a human operator would know to never do tend to not
be explicitly captured, but can be behaviours that a system should (or must) avoid.
• How ‘busy’ will the system be? The answer to this question can be in the form of
minimum/maximum throughputs, real-time bounds, or other measures. Essentially, the
specifications need some environmental context. For example, the automated air traffic
control system may vacuously assert that it can always keep the airspace free of conflict
by grounding all aircraft, or limiting the number of flights. However, if the specification
includes an indication of the minimum level of traffic that is expected (e.g., all flight take-
off requests must be granted within a reasonable time bound modulo specific exceptions),
then this can prevent the autonomous system from setting such inappropriate limits or
learning undesirable behaviors. Such information, provided by regulators, might include
bounds on how many aircraft need to be able to fly in the airspace, the maximum allowable
wait time to be cleared to fly given safe environmental conditions, etc.
Finally, specifications need to be compositional: they can be low-level and apply to one
particular software routine or high-level and apply to the high-level architecture of the system.
Because verification efforts are organised compositionally, as is safety cases coordination, there
is a need to organise and divide the above list of types of specifications for each level/system
component.
6 The Therac-25 was a computer-controlled radiation therapy machine, involved in at least six accidents between
1985 and 1987, where patients were given radiation doses hundreds of times greater than normal, resulting in death
or serious injury [157].
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3.3 A Process for Identifying Requirements for Certification
We now present a simple process that can be used to provide guidance in identifying properties
that need to be specified as verification properties for certification. The key idea is that, if the
autonomous system is performing tasks that are currently done by humans, then knowledge
about how these humans are currently licenced can be used to help identify requirements. So, if
the humans currently performing the task require some form of licensing (e.g., driver’s license,
pilot’s license, medical license, engineering certification, therapy certificate, etc.), then carefully
considering what the licensing process assesses and, then, how this might be assessed for an
autonomous software system, would move a step towards their certification.
A motivating insight is that domains most likely to require (or benefit) from regulation and
certification of autonomous agents are those domains where humans are very likely to have to
be appropriately certified.
One challenge is that software and humans are very different in their abilities. Certain as-
sumed characteristics of humans, such as common sense, or self-preservation, will need to be
explicitly considered and assessed for software, even though they may not be assessed at all for
humans. But even when a characteristic of the humans is assessed as part of a licensing regime,
it may well need to be assessed in a different way for an autonomous software system. For ex-
ample, a written exam to assess domain knowledge may work for humans, since limited memory
requires the human to be able to reason about the domain to answer questions, but would not
work for a software system that could merely memorise knowledge without being able to apply
it.
We consider four key areas:
1. the licensing that is used for humans;
2. the assumed human capabilities (often unassessed) that are relevant;
3. the relevant laws and regulations, and what justifiable deviations might exist; and
4. the interface that artefacts (e.g., a cockpit) used by humans (and hence to be used by
autonomous software systems replacing humans) presents.
We now discuss these aspects in turn, beginning with licensing.
Licensing: We now consider some of the qualities that licensing might assess, and for each
indicate how we might assess this quality for an autonomous software system that is replacing a
human:
• Physical capabilities (e.g., can execute the sequence of fine-tuned adjustments required to
land a plane) – this can be assessed for autonomous software by simulation, and assessing
specific component sub-skills.
• Domain knowledge (e.g., does the human know all of the protocols for safe operation,
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how to read and interpret domain-specific updates like Notices to Airmen (NOTAMs7)) –
for an autonomous software system, this would need to assess the ability to apply (oper-
ationalise) the domain knowledge in a range of scenarios designed to require this domain
knowledge in order to behave appropriately. Note that this assessment could be in the
form of a test (running some scenarios and observing the resulting behaviour), or in the
form of formal verification (showing that certain properties always hold).
• Regulatory knowledge (e.g., does the human know all of the rules, such as restrictions on
flying in different classes of airspace) – this can be tested similarly to domain knowledge.
• Ethical normalisation (e.g., does the human understand the importance assigned to the
hierarchy of regulations from the regulatory body such as the FAA). An example would
be that if an Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) is going to crash, the remote human operator
needs to understand that it is better to clearly communicate to the appropriate air traffic
control authority that the UAS will violate a geofence surrounding an unpopulated area
and proceed to do that. The alternative, obeying the geofence but crashing the UAS into
a populated area, is not acceptable – for autonomous software, one could verify certain
priorities, if the reasoning is explicitly represented in a decision-making component, or
assess performance in scenarios designed to present these sort of ethical challenges.
Assumed human capabilities: Various characteristics of humans may not be assessed at
all, but simply assumed, since they are sufficiently universal, and, for some characteristics, it
is very clear if they are absent (e.g., a human lacking physical mobility (lacking requirements
for physical capabilities), or being a child (lacking requirements for advanced ethical normal-
ization) would be clear without requiring explicit assessment). Specifically, in considering as-
sessment of autonomous software systems, we would want to carefully consider what human
characteristics are required and assumed to hold, without any assessment. Typical questions
might include:
• For example, we assume a pilot knows that, when flying a passenger plane, the passengers
require a certain amount of time to fasten seat belts.
• Does the human need assumed (but untested) physical capabilities? For example, a pilot
can sense when something is wrong from certain sounds or vibrations in a plane that may
not be present in simulations or ground tests for certification.
• Does the human need a certain level of maturity or life experience? For example, a sound
may be readily identifiable as ‘bad’ even if the pilot has never heard it previously.
• Does it assume basic properties of human values/ethics, such as that the pilot would
never crash the plane on purpose because the pilot has a strong inclination toward self-
preservation? Does it assume an operator would never choose to hurt others?
7 A NOTAM is “a notice distributed by means of telecommunication containing information concerning the es-
tablishment, condition or change in any aeronautical facility, service, procedure or hazard, the timely knowledge of
which is essential to personnel concerned with flight operations.” [114]
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On the other hand, certain human characteristics that need to be assessed when certifying humans
may not need to be considered when certifying software. For instance, psychological state,
or personality aspects (such as being aggressive, having a big ego and therefore being over-
sensitive to criticism of flying ability, or being impulsive) should not need to be considered for
autonomous agents.
Legal factors: Often licensing includes testing for knowledge of relevant laws and regula-
tions. We consider legal factors separately because this is a key source of specifications, and
because the licensing assessment may not cover all relevant regulations and laws.
As per the three layers framework, we need to identify not just the ‘by the book’ rules (e.g.,
regulations and laws). Rather, we also need to consider situations where these rules may need to
be (justifiably) overridden, and the principles that would need to be used to make such decisions.
The key questions are: in what situations should the rules be overridden? How can the system
identify these situations? And how can the system decide what to actually do in these situations?
More specific questions to be considered include:
• What situations could lead to outcomes considered to be ‘bad’, ‘unsafe’, ‘insecure’, or oth-
erwise universally to-be-avoided if at all possible? And how bad are each of these? Are
some worse than others? If there is a choice, is there any ranking or cost (possibly prob-
abilistic) that can be associated with each? For example, if an autonomously-operating
UAS is going to crash and must choose between crashing into a pile of trash on a curb or
the car parked next to the pile of trash, the cost function would be expected to steer the
crash landing toward the pile of trash. This could be defined in terms of minimising the
repair cost of the affected property. One might furthermore define the cost of harming a
human in a crash as higher than any situation where a human is not harmed.
• Are some rules more important to obey than others? Are there divisions of the rules into
hard constraints versus soft constraints? Is there some partial ordering on the importance
of the rules?
• Are there any acceptable reasons to break the rules?
In order to develop a system that can meet the requirements, we need to also consider what are
the computational requirements of the system. What does it need to be able to measure, deduce,
or decide?
Note that context is often left unspecified but it importantly restricts the applicability of
licensing. To take context into account, we identify the licensing requirements, and then, for
each requirement, consider whether it is relevant for the system. For example, for an auto-
pilot that is only used while the plane is at cruising altitude, we would not need to consider
requirements related to landing, or interaction with ground obstacles, even though these are
requied for a human to earn a pilot’s license.
Human-system interface: There is also a collection of similar factors that relate to the in-
terface that a human currently uses to interact with artefacts. Such artefacts are designed for
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human use, and if a human performing the task is going to be replaced by an autonomous soft-
ware system, then whether the existing interface presented by the artefact embodies assumptions
about humans should be taken into account. Specifically:
• Does the interface assume physical shapes of humans, such as being operated by a human
hand?
• Does it assume physical limitations of humans, such as having a minimum reaction time
or a maximum speed for selecting multiple controls in sequence?
• Does it assume mental limitations of humans, such as taking into account that a human
cannot instantly take control of a system but requires orientation to the operational context
to make reasonable decisions?
• Does it assume that human-type faults will occur, such as being designed to avoid human
confusion modes?
• Does it assume that common sense deductions on the part of the operator are automatic?
For example, a human pilot will automatically notice if the wing detaches from the aircraft
and there is no explicit requirement that the aircraft operator must continuously ensure the
aircraft has both wings but an autonomous system would need to be explicitly designed
to consider this a fault (not just the instability it causes) and, e.g., avoid future control
decisions that would only work if the aircraft had two wings [217]. There is not a sensor
for every ‘obvious’ fault yet an autonomous system needs to account for all faults that are
obvious to humans, even when they trigger fault warnings for unrelated errors.8
There are three options to deal with a situation where a human is being replaced (partially or
completely) with software, and the human interacts with an existing artefact using an interface.
These options are: to retain the interface, and have the software interact with it, to extend the
artefact with additional interfaces for the software, or to replace the artefact’s interface com-
pletely. The process for identifying requirements is summarised in Figure 7.
3.4 Verification of Autonomous Software Systems
In Section 2.2 we observed that the most solid and reliable way to certify autonomous software
systems would be the adoption of formal methods.
Formal methods are mathematically rigorous techniques for design, specification, validation,
and verification of a wide variety of systems. They contribute to certification in a number of
ways, from requirements design, to checking that all requirements can be true of the same system
at the same time (before the system is built) [198], to verifying that early (or even partial) designs
always satisfy requirements, to generating test cases, to checking during system runtime that the
system is still meeting requirements.
8 This is not an artificial example: there was a case of an engine exploding, resulting in a large number of seemingly
unrelated alerts [72]. Thankfully, in that instance, the human pilot realised what had happened, and was then able to
safely land the plane.
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1. Consider licensing requirements
• If physical skills are assessed then use simulations to assess software’s sensors and
affectors
• If domain and/or regulation knowledge is assessed (e.g., using a written test), then
assess the software using scenarios designed to assess the operationalisation of this
knowledge
• If ethical aspects are assessed then:
– If the software system includes explicit reasoning about these aspects, then ver-
ify these rules,
– Else assess the system using scenarios designed to assess ethically-appropriate
behaviour
2. Consider (typically assumed and unassessed) human characteristics
• Basic knowledge and capabilities (e.g., maths, reading, basic folk psychology &
physics)
• Basic common sense, maturity, life experience
• Values and ethics (e.g., self-preservation)
3. Consider relevant regulation and laws including justifiable deviations from the rules
4. Consider human-system interfaces
• What assumptions does the interface make about the operator being a human?
• How to replace the interface:
– retain it
– extend it with additional interfaces
– replace it
Fig. 7: Summary of the process for identifying requirements.
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In order to verify that a system operates correctly, we need to know how the system works.
If we do not have sufficient information on both how the system operates and what it means for
the system to operate safely, then it is impossible to verify that these two behaviour spaces match
up with each other. Knowing how the system works includes knowing sufficient implementation
details to be able to certify correctness.
Though each method works differently, intuitively all formal methods verify that the system
– or a model of the system – does what we expect it to do and nothing else. This capability
is required for certification, e.g., via safety cases per the standards of the aerospace industry,
where certification requires making a case, backed by evidence, that the system meets standards
for safety and reliability.
In some formal methods, such as model checking and theorem proving, both the system
under certification and the properties to be verified are modelled using a rigorous, mathemati-
cal or logical language. We indicate these methods as formal at the property & system level.
The system model itself, however, is necessarily an abstraction of the real system and hence it
is incomplete: any results from methods that operate, albeit in a rigorous way, on abstractions
of real systems, should be validated against the actual environment. (Note that many modern
model checkers and theorem provers are now capable of generating software from their proven
models that can be used as a basis for, or as the entire, real system implementation thus enabling
straightforward validation.) Other methods model the properties to check using rigorous for-
malisms and languages, and check the property against the real system under certification. We
define these methods, which include some static analysis approaches and runtime verification,
as formal at the property level. Semi-formal methods specify either the system or the properties
that they should meet using languages with informal or semi-formal semantics. UML [33] and
Agent-UML [21] are examples of semi-formal specification languages, as well as test cases. In-
formal methods are based on specifications provided in natural language and are out of the scope
of our investigation.
In this section we review five verification methods: model checking, theorem proving, static
analysis, runtime verification, and systematic testing. The first four of these are usually cate-
gorised as formal or semi-formal methods. Software testing is not a formal method, but it is
one of the most widely adopted verification approaches in industry, often associated with qual-
ity assurance. The ‘Software Testing Services Market by Product, End-users, and Geography –
Global Forecast and Analysis 2019-2023’ [99] foresees that the software testing services mar-
ket will grow at a compounded average growth rate of over 12% during the period 2019-2023.
Software testing – once automated and seamlessly integrated in a development method, as in the
‘continuous integration model’ – may indeed represent a useful complement to formal methods.
Testing can be measurably improved by using artefacts from formal verification for test-case
generation. However, as is well-known, testing is not exhaustive, which limits its utility.
Figure 8 positions the five methods in a space characterised by the formality, exhaustivennes,
and static vs. dynamic dimensions. Figure 9 details the formal methods and their relationships.
A method is exhaustive when it verifies the entire behaviour space, over all possible inputs,
including for an infinite input space. Exhaustive verification includes proving both the existence
of ‘good’ or required behaviours and the absence of ‘bad’ or requirements-violating behaviours,
something that can never be demonstrated through testing or simulation. Being exhaustive refers
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Fig. 8: Knowledge map of the verification methods discussed in this section.
to the capability of exhaustively exploring the state space generated by the system model, as it
is not currently possible, except for a small class of systems with specific characteristics, to be
exhaustive with respect to a system of realistic industrial size.
A method is static when it is applied on the system’s code, or on its abstract/simplified
model, without needing the real system to be executed. A method is dynamic when it operates
while the system runs.
Model Checking: This method performs an exhaustive check that a system, given in a logical
language, always satisfies its requirements. Intuitively, model checking explores all possible
executions of the system, checking the system model cannot reach states that violate the provided
verification properties.
• Inputs: (1) a logical description of the system (either a model in a logical language such
as SMV [169] or AIGER [30], or the system itself, e.g., for software systems); (2) a
requirement in a temporal logic such as LTL. See [199] for a survey with examples.
• Outputs: (1) an automated (push-button) proof (usually by assertion, without the full
proof argument) that the system always satisfies the requirement; or (2) a counterexample,
which is an execution trace of the system from system initialisation that shows a step-by-
step path to a system state where the system has operated faithfully to its definition yet
still violated the requirement.
• Strengths:
– Automated. Counterexamples are excellent maps for debugging and are generated
without guidance from the user.
– Exhaustive. Verification reasons over the entire state space.
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Fig. 9: The tree of Formal Methods; solid lines represent direct variations whereas dashed lines
represent related derivations. Symbolic model checking [199] is divided into three ma-
jor algorithms under the hood: BDD (binary decision diagram), BMC (bounded model
checking), and IC3 (a pseudo-acronym sometimes replaced with PDR for property-
directed reachability). As a subtlety, the BMC and IC3 algorithms are not complete by
themselves but many tools use these acronyms to refer to those algorithms supplemented
with proofs to make them complete. Both model checking and theorem proving com-
monly use SAT (Boolean satisfiability) and SMT (satisfiability modulo theories) solvers
under the hood.
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– Verification of Absence of Bad Behaviours. Model checking both gives the exis-
tence proof that a system always does what we expect given the inputs and that the
system never does something we don’t expect for any input. In other words, given
an appropriate specification, it verifies the absence of behaviours that we don’t want,
whether they are triggered by an input or no input at all.
– Incremental. Model checking can efficiently analyse partial models/partial systems;
can be used from the earliest stages of the design process to save time pursuing
designs that cannot satisfy their requirements based on the partial design-so-far.
• Weaknesses: Model checking is garbage-in, garbage-out; the results are only as accu-
rate as the input system/model and the input requirement. One approach for validating
the results of model checking against the actual environment by recognising assumption
violations at runtime has been proposed in [79, 80], but the example addressed there is
simpler than any real autonomous system. Modelling a system in a logical language and
specifying a requirement in a temporal logic are the biggest bottlenecks to the use of
model checking [200]; both tasks are difficult to complete and to validate. It is easy to
create models that are too large to analyse with current technology, such as large pieces
of software or models over large numbers of variables. Not all logical systems can be
specified in languages that can be model-checked.
• Applicability: model checking is widely used for both hardware and software, such
as that seen in the RULES LAYER [17, 50, 51, 97]. System protocals are particularly
amenable to model checking; it has successfully verified real-life, full-scale communi-
cation protocols [174, 66], air traffic control systems [238, 167, 86], wheel braking sys-
tems [37], and more. Model checking has been used for the REACTIONS LAYER, but
quickly reduces to either hybrid model checking or the verification of coarse abstrac-
tions [2, 5, 94, 149]. Hybrid model checking can involve a wide array of numerical
techniques aimed at solving, for example, differential equations concerning control or
environmental models. For the PRINCIPLES LAYER, model-checking has been used for
verifying BDI agents [34, 35, 36], epistemic and temporal properties of multiagent sys-
tems [155, 156, 179], the agents knowledge, strategies and games [161], and general,
high-level decision making [61] that has been extended to ethical principles [40, 62].
We note one important variation, program model-checking [222]. Per its name, program model
checking replaces the abstract model with the actual code/software system. It uses the same
model-checking algorithms, but on symbolic executions of the system. The advantage of such
an approach is that it simplifies model validation (e.g., proving the link between the model and
the real program/system) since we directly check the real program. However, a disadvantage
is that the use of techniques such as symbolic execution can make the checking process slow
and complex. Finally, note that the PRINCIPLES LAYER model-checking of high-level, and
ethical, decision-making described above [61, 62, 40] actually utilise program model checking
over rational agents [63, 60].
Theorem Proving. A user creates a proof that a system satisfies its requirements that is
checked by a known-to-be-correct proof assistant. Some automation of standard logical deduc-
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tions is included in the proof assistant.
• Inputs: A theorem asserting a requirement holds over the system; the same large proof
includes relevant definitions of the system and (sub-) requirements and any necessary
axioms.
• Outputs: A computer-checked proof that the theorem holds. If no such proof can exist
(e.g., because the theorem does not hold), the user might gain the necessary insight into
why this is the case from the way in which the proof fails.
• Strengths: Theorem proving can provide strong type-checking and generate proof obli-
gations that provide unique insight into system operation. The proofs generated are re-
playable: they can be re-run by any future user at any time. If the input theorem changes
(e.g., to perform a proof over the next version of the system) the old proof can be replayed
(in some contexts) and only prompt the user for input where small changes are needed to
update the proof to the new theorem. Proofs can be built up in extensible libraries and hi-
erarchically inherit from/build upon each other. Large swaths of mathematics important to
assertions over safety-critical systems have been proved in free libraries associated with
the most popular theorem proving tools. Theorem proving can, and has, checked very
large systems, even beyond what humans can inspect, such as the four-colour theorem
[12].
• Weaknesses: This formal method requires the most experience from users and has a
comparatively high learning curve relative to other forms of verification. Setting up a
proof correctly is a difficult activity even for trained experts. The user is the sole source
of insight into why proofs fail; there is no automated counterexample like with model
checking.
• Applicability: Theorem-proving has been widely used for software seen in the RULES
LAYER, and techniques such as Hoare Logic [95] and tools such as Isabelle [178] are
often used there. Theorem-proving has been used for the REACTIONS LAYER, most no-
tably verification of NASA’s aerospace systems via PVS [85, 182, 172, 173], verification
of, e.g., automotive protocols through the KeyMaera system [185, 184], and the use of
theorem-proving tools to prove control system stability [146]. See [44] for an introduction
to PVS specification for a Boeing 737 autopilot. Theorem-proving for the PRINCIPLES
LAYER is less common, though it has been tackled [41].
Static Analysis. During system design time, an automated tool examines a program or code
fragment without executing it, to check for common bugs. Static analysis can be combined with
techniques for expanding the types of bugs found, including symbolic execution (analysing a
program’s control flow using symbolic values for variables to create a map of program execu-
tion with provable constraints), abstract interpretation (creating an abstraction of the program’s
semantics that enables proofs about its execution), and shape analysis (mapping the program’s
memory signature through its data structures).
• Inputs: Program or code fragment to analyse
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• Outputs: List or visualisation of possible code defects
• Strengths: Automated tools analyse the structure of the code rather than just paths through
the code like testing; they can therefore provide a deeper analysis with better code cover-
age. Static analysis is faster and more reliable than the alternative of manual code review.
Though performance depends on the programming language and static analysis tool, per-
forming static analysis is usually totally automated with easy-to-understand output suit-
able for a non-expert in verification.
• Weaknesses: Static analysers have no understanding of developer intent (e.g., they can de-
tect that a function may access unallocated memory but will not find that the function does
a different task than intended/labeled in the comments). They cannot enforce full coding
standards, e.g., because some coding rules are open to interpretation, like those concerning
comments, good documentation, and understandable variable names. The above ambigui-
ties (in programmer intent, coding standards, use cases, etc.) can lead to false positive and
false negative defect reports. False negatives mean that the analyser has failed to identify
an error, can lead to fallacious trust in the software. False positives mean that the analyser
reports an error where there is none, can cause a lot of wasted work at the developer’s
side.
• Applicability: Static analysis covers a range of different methods. Basic checks, i.e.,
whether each used variable was previously initialised, are included in most modern com-
pilers. More sophisticated checks, e.g., whether pointer access may lead to an exception,
are realised by widely used tools such as Lint [84]. High-end static analysers such as
Polyspace [166] and Astre´e [53] are able to check for general assertions. A review of
40 static code analysis tools updated to November 2019 is available via the Software
Testing Help blog [216]. According to CENELEC EN50128, static analysis is highly
recommended for all safety-relevant software. Consequently, static analysis has been ap-
plied for most safety-critical software in avionics, railway and automotive; e.g., NASA
regularly releases its own home-grown static analysis tools including (Java) Symbolic
PathFinder[163], IKOS (Inference Kernel for Open Static Analyzers) [38], and C Global
Surveyor (CGS) [39]. Static analysis techniques generally analyze software in the RULES
LAYER. The REACTIONS LAYER requires analysis techniques able to deal with con-
tinuous physical models, and the PRINCIPLES LAYER requires the ability to deal with
potentially complex reasoning. Although static analysis can analyze autonmous systems’
software, its key weakness, being non-exhaustive, limits the utility of applying it.
Runtime Verification. Runtime verification (RV) is a semi-formal method aimed at check-
ing the current run of the system. RV is most often run online (e.g., embedded on-board the sys-
tem during operation), and stream-based (e.g., evaluating requirements continuously throughout
system operation), though it can also be run offline (e.g., with recorded data for post-mission
analysis).
• Inputs: (1) Input data stream or streams containing time-stamped sensor or software val-
ues, e.g., sent over a system bus to the RV engine; (2) A requirement to verify, expressed
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in the form of a temporal logic formula, most commonly Mission-time Linear Temporal
Logic (MLTL) [195, 159, 160] or First-Order Linear Temporal Logic (FOLTL) [67, 20]
whose variables are set by the input data or operationally via finite state automata, trace
expressions [8], etc. (see Sect 2.1 of [73]).
• Outputs: For online, stream-based RV, the output is a stream of 〈time, verdict〉 tuples
containing a time stamp and the verdict from the valuation of the temporal logic require-
ment (true or false), evaluated over the data stream starting from that time step. Variations
on RV include extensions to non-Boolean (e.g., Bayesian or otherwise probabilistic) re-
sults, and evaluations of only part of the data stream of interest.
• Strengths: RV is the only formal verification technique that can run during system de-
ployment. Sanity checks can provide near-instant confirmation that a system is obeying
its requirements or that a failure has occurred, providing an efficient mitigation trigger.
Like simulation, RV can also provide useful characterisations of system runs, though RV
analyzes runs in terms of violations of formal specifications; see [201] for a detailed com-
parison.
• Weaknesses: Specification of the requirement to monitor at runtime is the biggest bot-
tleneck to successful deployment of RV [200]. Specifications are difficult to write for the
same reasons as for model checking; further complications include noisiness of sensor
data and challenges of real-world environments. Limitations and constraints of embedded
systems and certification processes challenge RV implementations, though to date two
tools have risen to these real-world-deployment challenges and more are sure to follow
[202, 3]. Of course, violation of certain critial safety properties is not acceptable, even
if this is detected. Since RV operates at (or after) runtime, it is not suitable for such
properties.
• Applicability: RV is widely used for software in RULES LAYER as discussed for exam-
ple by (author?) [197] and by (author?) [90]; see (author?) [213] for another example.
RV of multiagent systems using trace expressions [9, 78] is also a viable approach to
cope with the RULES LAYER. RV has been used for the REACTIONS LAYER, for ex-
ample by (author?) [19]. The R2U2 framework [195, 87, 207, 202, 171] is a real-time,
Realisable, Responsive, Unobtrusive Unit for runtime system analysis, including secu-
rity threat detection, implemented in either FPGA hardware or software. R2U2 analyzes
rules and reactions spanning the RULES LAYERand (with the addition of a parallel system
model) the REACTIONS LAYERof our reference framework. For the PRINCIPLES LAYER,
(author?) [57] survey the use of norms for monitoring of the behaviour of autonomous
agents: monitoring of norms is indeed foundational for processes of accountability, en-
forcement, regulation and sanctioning. The idea of a runtime ethical monitor, or governor,
is also commonly used [15, 230].
Software Testing. Software Testing (ST) is not a formal method, though formal methods are
often used for test-case geeration with provable qualities, such as coverage metrics. ST amounts
to observing the execution of a software system to validate whether it behaves as intended and
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identify potential malfunctions [29]. Testing can take place at different levels including Unit
Testing, which tests individual units of source code; Integration Testing, aimed at testing a col-
lection of software modules seen as a group; System Testing, carried out on a complete integrated
system to evaluate its compliance with respect to its functional and/or system requirements; and
User Acceptance Testing, meant to determine if the systems meets its requirements in terms of
a specification or contract, and allow the user to accept the system, or not.
• Inputs: Depending on the test level and on the testing technique adopted for the level,
the inputs that feed the ST application can change dramatically. For example, Unit Test-
ing tests source code, while System Testing may follow a black-box approach, with the
stucture of the system unknown to the tester.
• Outputs: As for RV, ST always consists of observing a sample of executions, and giving
a verdict over them. The output may be an association between a test case, an execution
run, and the respective verdict.
• Strengths: ST can be performed in an agile way [23] and can be directly integrated in the
software development method [22], allowing the software to be developed and tested in
the same development cycle. ST techniques may be very efficient; coverage analysis and
reliability measures can help in performing an ‘as complete as possible’ testing.
• Weaknesses: Software Testing is not exhaustive. Identifying the most relevant units,
functions, or functionalities to test is not easy, and finding the right balance between test-
ing enough, but not too much, requires a deep understanding of the system under test. In
particular, testing autonomous systems is hard since the range of possible behaviours that
can be exhibited by an autonomous agent can be vast [228, 227]. The design and devel-
opment of test cases is expensive; if the system under test changes, test cases developed
for a previous version might not be reusable for the new one. Importantly, ST can never
verify the absence of bad or undesirable behaviours, only the (partial) existance of desir-
able ones. Also unlike formal methods, ST requires a complete, executable system to test,
pushing ST verification later in the design lifecycle than formal verification, which easily
analyzes partial, early system designs.
• Applicability: While software testing is commonly used in industry for both the REAC-
TIONS LAYER and RULES LAYER, and is applied for testing features at both levels in
autonomous [93, 208] and multiagent systems [176], we are not aware of proposals for
testing the PRINCIPLES LAYER of an autonomous system.
The analysis that we carried out shows that no golden bullet exists for addressing the cer-
tification, via formal and semi-formal verification, of autonomous systems. All the methods
considered in this section show strengths and weaknesses. Also, the applicability to the PRIN-
CIPLES LAYER is not widespread yet. While a few proposals exist for some formal methods, the
challenges to face are many and the initial ideas sprouting from the research community must
still consolidate and turn into practical and usable applications.
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4 Illustrative Examples
In this section we discuss some examples demonstrating the generality of the framework. The
authors are aware that currently these systems are not likely to be certified; however, this might
change in the future.
We exemplify systems that can operate independently, and argue that we can extend the
framework for the case of operation in a group. For example, we can consider a single au-
tonomous aeroplane, or a swarm of UAS; drive a car, or do car platooning; interact with a
stand-along personal assistant agent (PAA), or use this as an interface to a complete smart-home
environment.
Table 7 contrasts over several dimensions some examples of autonomous systems in various
domains: the same systems/domains were illustrated in Fig. 5. Note that the second column of
Table 7 indicates the (current or near future) scope of autonomy (based on Fig. 5), whereas the
next column indicates the (somewhat longer-term future) level of autonomy.
We remind the reader of the levels of autonomy introduced in Section 1.1, Definition 1: no
autonomy; low autonomy; assistance systems; partial autonomy; conditional autonomy; high
autonomy; full autonomy.
Our examples are often quite distinct and, in particular, differ with respect to the complexity
of their decision-making. By this, we mean the amount of information used to determine the
system’s behaviour in any given situation. Usually, this complexity is known only to the designer
of the autonomous system, it can not be observed from the outside. In the most basic form,
decisions are based directly on inputs of certain sensors such as ultrasonic distance sensors,
lidars, cameras, etc. A typical decision would be “if there is an obstacle to the left, then move to
the right”. We consider such low-level decisions, where the action is derived directly from the
sensory input, to be of low complexity. Additionally, however, the system can have some built-in
knowledge concerning its environment that influences its behaviour; this could be map data, time
tables, situation databases, rule books, etc. The internal state of an autonomous agent has been
modelled in terms of its beliefs, intentions and desires. We consider algorithms which rely on
extensive models of the environment to be of medium or high complexity. More sophisticated
algorithms are taking the history of decisions into account, thus “learning from experience”.
Such algorithms can adapt to changing environments and tasks, evolving constantly. Thus, even
the designer of a system can not predict its behaviour with certainty, if the system has been
operating for some time. We consider such decision making to be of very high complexity.
The examples differ also with respect to their potential harm, here defined generally as “neg-
ative outcomes” to individuals or society. One aspect of this is safety — the absence of physical
harm. In the international standard IEC 61508 on functional safety, five safety integrity levels
(SILs) have been defined. SIL0 means there are no safety related requirements, SIL1–4 refer to
low, medium, high and very high safety related requirements, respectively. Other domains such
as aerospace and automotive have come up with similar safety classifications. The categoriza-
tion of a (sub-)system into a certain SIL class is done by considering the risk which the system
imposes on its environment. This is the likelihood of occurrence of a malfunction multiplied by
its possible consequences.
It is clear that systems/scenarios with higher levels of potential harm will require strong
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regulation. So, both in Table 7 and later subsections, we have highlighted the level of regulation
available. In most cases, this regulation does not mention ‘autonomy’ nor consider that the
human might not be “in control”. We would expect that systems with high potential risk will have
stronger forms of regulation. The current amount of available regulation for each of the sample
systems is indicated in Table 7, ranging from ‘low’ (scattered or unsystematic regulations; points
of inconsistency or obsolescence in regulations) to ‘high’ (comprehensive regulatory framework;
consistent and current regulations). In addition, once autonomy is introduced, and especially
where this can impact upon safety or other potential harms, then enhanced regulations for this
aspect will be essential. As yet, specific attention to aspects and implications of autonomy is
rarely made.
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Tab. 7: Examples of autonomous systems.
System Scope of Targeted Future Complexity of Potential Amount of
Autonomy Autonomy Decision Making Harm Existing Regulation
Robot vacuum cleaner low high low none low
Autonomous trading system low-medium high low high low-medium
Driverless train low-medium full medium very high high
Unmanned aerial system medium full high very high medium
Self-driving car medium-high full high high low-medium
Personal assistant agent high full very high low-medium low
Home assistant robot high high very high medium low
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In the following, for each example we first describe the functionalities, and then position
the functionalities of the example w.r.t. the three layers in our reference autonomy framework.
We then describe the trends in the domain, in particular around the future level of autonomy per
Definition 1. Subsequently, we comment on the safety-criticality of the example, and hence the
amount of likely needed and available regulation. Finally, we comment on suitable verification,
validation, and analysis techniques for the example.
4.1 Simple case: Robot Vacuum Cleaner
Functionalities: We begin with a simple example: a domestic robot tasked with simple objec-
tives, such as vacuuming or sweeping the floor, or cutting grass in the lawn.
Positioning w.r.t. the layers in our reference autonomy framework: In terms of the three
layer model, this sort of domestic robot illustrates that in some situations, not all of the layers
are needed. There is, of course, a need for a REACTIONS LAYER, which deals with physical
aspects of the environment (sensing, positioning, locomotion, and physical actions). There is
also a need for a RULES LAYER that follows well-defined rules for ‘normal’ situations. Such
rules might specify a regular schedule for cleaning, as well as indicating when this schedule
might be abandoned or changed (e.g., due to human request, or the system detecting a situation
in which cleaning ought to be postponed, such as a dinner party). The vacuum cleaner must limit
its maximum speed to avoid harm, change direction if it encounters an obstacle, stop if it detects
a fault of any kind, and obey the boundaries of its electric fence. The PRINCIPLES LAYER of a
vacuum cleaner is trivial, since the system’s functionality is relatively simple. Specifically, we
do not expect the system to deal with any unusual situations that would require it to override
the ‘normal situation’ rules. The cases when the robot is stuck, or jammed, or too hot due to
unexpected warming, can be considered as ‘normal situations’ and dealt with by the simple
‘switch off’ rule. The only way the application of this rule could harm, would be to cause a
human to stumble into the robot which stopped in an unexpected position, but in this scenario
we are assuming that humans can cope with the presence of the robot in their home, which
means, they have the ability to perceive and avoid it.
Level of (future) autonomy: According to our categorization, such robots are designed to
operate highly autonomous in their respective environment. Human assistance is necessary only
for the initial set up, for emptying the dustbin, refilling cleansing fluids, maintaining brushes
or blades, and repositioning the robot in case it is stuck or out of battery power. However, the
complexity of decision making in these devices is low: Often, the control programs are based
on a few sensory inputs only. Many of these robots navigate the area in a random fashion,
turning upon contact with another object, and moving towards the docking station guided by an
infrared beam if the power is low. More sophisticated models can learn a map of their operating
environment and use advanced path planning methods to traverse the whole area. There are no
complex interactions with other devices or actors in the environment. The scope of autonomy is
also low, given the limited autonomous functionality of these systems.
Safety criticality (of autonomous aspects): For this example we exclude the possibility of the
tasks having any direct safety consequence (such as caring for ill humans, having responsibility
for monitoring for injury, or providing medication), and we assume that the humans interacting
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with the robot are aware of its existence and can cope with it in a ‘normal’ way. Therefore, the
safety criticality of the devices is low.
Amount of available regulation (for autonomous aspects): With respect to available regula-
tion, there are just the general laws governing the use of electric equipment, batteries, etc.
Suitable verification, validation, and analysis techniques: Cleaning robots are often adopted
as simple and affordable examples to show the features and potential of different programming
languages, tools, and even verification and validation techniques [55]. Recently, four of the
latest premium robot vacuum cleaners were analyzed and compared by IoT experts according
to security and privacy issues [16], but no formal techniques were used there. Concerns have
arisen since some companies wanted to use data collected by such home devices — layout of the
house, operating hours etc. — for marketing purposes. While we agree that all the techniques
reviewed in Section 3.4 are suitable for checking that the robot REACTIONS LAYER and RULES
LAYER behave as expected, their application on real systems is often considered not to be worth
the effort, given the absence of safety issues. However, these devices make good exercises for
academic education in these techniques.
4.2 Autonomous Trading System
Functionalities: Autonomous trading systems (ATSs) operate in financial markets, submitting
buy and sell orders according to some trading strategy. ATSs have a history back to 1949, but
came to widespread attention after the ‘flash crash’ on the US stock exchange in 2010. By 2014
it was reported that in excess of 75% of trades in public US security markets were by ATSs [158].
An ATS submits market instructions, primarily in the form of a buy or sell order. It may decide
when to do so, and the commodity, quantity, and bid or ask price. ATSs can operate in any market
where they are permitted, such as a stock market or an energy market. In notable contrast to un-
aided human traders, ATSs can operate high-frequency trading. The price prediction techniques
and trading strategies vary. For example, the stock price of a single company might be predicted
using a non-linear function approximator [18], and the trading strategy might be based on a set
of rules.
Positioning w.r.t. the layers in our reference autonomy framework: With respect to the layers
in our reference autonomy framework, we can locate the communications protocols and simple
but fast responses to market stimuli (“if the price is below threshold, then issue a sales request”)
at the REACTIONS LAYER. More sophisticated trading rules and strategies, which take general
market evolution and developments into account (“if there is a shortage of oil, then coal prices
are likely to rise”), are located at the RULES LAYER. Although we might anticipate a possible
PRINCIPLES LAYER that reasoned about unusual situations, such as suspending the usual trading
strategy in the face of a stock market crash, the speed of trading makes this unlikely, and in
practice, we would not expect a PRINCIPLES LAYER to be used.
Level of (future) autonomy: Current ATSs are already capable of operating autonomously,
without moment-by-moment human intervention. Nonetheless, ATSs can be used also as an
assistant by a human trader, for example to automatically build or maintain a position specified
by the trader. It is likely that the degree of autonomous operation and the time-scale of opera-
tion will increase, whereas humans become less able to have oversight of the trading behaviour
except at a high level. The scope of autonomy depends on the sophistication of the ATS, and
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varies from low (for relatively simple ATSs that follow simple trading rules), to medium for
more sophisticated ATSs.
Safety criticality (of autonomous aspects): Given the disruption to financial markets from
ATSs, they have a high level of potential harm, and hence are considered safety-critical. Issues
of concern with respect to safety include software errors, herd trading, market fragility, manip-
ulative market strategies, lack of scrutability, the need for an algorithmic ‘kill switch’, and fair
market access.
Amount of available regulation (for autonomous aspects): Given the safety criticality of
ATSs, the needed regulation is high. Regulation has increased since ATSs became a standard
tool in the financial sector in the 21st century. In the US, the financial authorities introduced
stricter rules following the 2010 crash. These pertain to algorithmic trading behaviour, but also
to the use of ATSs more generally, and the responsibility of the companies using ATSs to have
adequate supervision of ATSs [81].
Suitable verification, validation, and analysis techniques: These ATSs are essentially feed-
back control systems. As such, standard analysis techniques from control systems such as an-
alytic stability proofs or algorithmic hybrid systems verification [94, 185] could be deployed.
However, such approaches require a very good model of the environment, and its reactions, in
which the trading system resides. In particular, the environment includes other ATSs, and due to
commercial sensitivity, little is likely to be known about them. Without a precise environmental
formalism, verification and validation techniques are of little value. Testing can be applied in
this area but, again, strong verification cannot be achieved. Consequently, there is a danger of
‘run-away’ feedback loops that are impossible to predict beforehand.
4.3 Driverless Trains
Functionalities: Automatic railway systems for the transportation of people have been in use
since the beginning of the 21st century. Generally, these systems operate on dedicated routes,
which are protected from human access by special barriers. Moreover, often the systems are
designed in a way such that a collision of trains is physically impossible. Therefore, reliability
of these systems usually is very high, with failures being caused by mechanical fatigue rather
than by software errors.
Positioning w.r.t. the layers in our reference autonomy framework: All modern rail vehicles
have a Train Control and Management System (TCMS), which in conjunction with the on-board
signalling computer (OBC) is responsible for the basic operations of the train. With respect to
our three-level framework, TCMS and OBC realize the REACTIONS LAYER. In the autonomous
subway example described above, the RULES LAYER is responsible for planning the journey,
stops in the station, etc. A PRINCIPLES LAYER would be needed at least for unattended train
operation, and even more for trains which calculate their own route on the tracks. There are
many ‘unusual’ situations that can arise in such a scenario, which have to be dealt with by an
PRINCIPLES LAYER.
Level of (future) autonomy: Most present-day driverless trains, e.g., people-mover in airports,
have almost no autonomy. They operate according to fixed time schedules, with fixed distances
to other trains, and under tight supervision of a human operator. The situation becomes more
interesting when looking at self-driving underground vehicles. Some of these trains can also
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drive on tracks used by conventional subway trains. Thus, the autonomous vehicle has to decide
when to advance, and at which speed. In Nu¨rnberg, such a system has been operating for over
a decade, with more than 99% punctuality and without any accidents. A main benefit of the
autonomous operation is that it allows for a higher train frequency than with human-driven
trains. In underground train systems, the probability of an obstacle on the tracks is rather low.
For trams, regional trains, or high-speed trains, this is different. People or animals may cross the
tracks, and thunderstorms may blow trees onto the tracks. Therefore, one of the main tasks of a
train driver is to supervise the journey and to brake if necessary. Other tasks include monitoring
for unusual events, checking the equipment before the trip, and passenger handling. There is an
increasing number of electronic driver advisory systems such as speed recommendation systems,
driver information systems, and others. Currently, all these systems leave responsibility for the
trip to the driver. However, there is no compelling argument that an automated system could
not do this task, increasing the autonomy of the system even further. However, the scope of
autonomy is not high, since the functionality of the system is constrained by its environment
(running on tracks).
The norm IEC 62290-1:2014 (Railway applications – Urban guided transport management
and command/control systems – Part 1: System principles and fundamental concepts) defines
five grades of automation (GoA). These can be compared with the levels of autonomy given in
Definition 1. The fourth grade is driverless train operation (DTO), where the only tasks of the
(human) train attendant are to handle passengers, control the doors and to take over control in
emergency situations. The fifth grade is unattended train operation (UTO), where there is no
personnel from the train line operator on board. That means, the electronic systems need to be
able to deal also with emergency situations.
Safety criticality (of autonomous aspects): Compared to other domains, railway homologation
and operation is strictly regulated. For the approval of a particular system, the authorities rely on
notified bodies, designated bodies and associated bodies. These are institutions that assess the
conformity of rail equipment to certain standards such as Cenelec 50128 [48]. The assessment
processes are strongly schematic. For safety-critical software, known best practices, including
formal methods, have to be applied.
Amount of available regulation (for autonomous aspects): However, the available regulation
in the railway sector is not prepared to deal with higher levels of autonomy. For example, the
movement authority, i.e., the permission to enter a certain block, is currently given by the road-
side equipment or the railway control centre. There are research projects investigating whether
it is possible to transfer this responsibility to the train; this would require safe localization of a
train and reliable communication between trains. In such a truly autonomous setting, the ‘elec-
tronic driver’ not only has to ensure that the track is free from obstacles, but also that there are
no other trains in its way. Currently, it is unclear how such a system could be officially approved.
Suitable verification, validation, and analysis techniques: Railway software must be exten-
sively tested and verified before it can be put into use. Due to the cost and complexity, formal
verification is done for functions of the highest criticality only. These are mainly the signalling
and breaking functions. Testing is done on unit, integration, and system level: in contrast to
the automotive domain, road tests are extremely expensive; thus, developers strive to limit the
necessary road tests to a minimum. For autonomous driving, the problem becomes dramatically
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more severe, since it is not possible to test millions of different situations on the track.
4.4 Unmanned Aerial System
Functionalities: The term ‘Unmanned Aerial Systems’ (UAS) covers a wide range of airborne
vehicles, from toy quadrocopters to military drones and autonomous missiles. Whereas for
transportation of people an airplane without pilot is (yet) beyond discussion, the transport of
goods and material by UASs is a thrilling perspective. However, the main public concern is that
a falling UAS might harm people on the ground.
Positioning w.r.t. the layers in our reference autonomy framework: The mapping to our
three layer framework is fairly clear, as is the need for all three layers. Rapid responses to the
physical environment are provided by the REACTIONS LAYER, and there is a need to be able to
apply rules to usual situations (RULES LAYER) as well as deal with unanticipated situations by
applying principles (PRINCIPLES LAYER).
Level of (future) autonomy: Already now, human pilots have a wealth of support systems
at hand: navigation systems, autopilots, traffic collision avoidance systems, etc. Vital flight
information is recorded and transmitted to ground control. Cameras are available providing a
visual image from the cockpit. Therefore, moving from a human pilot within an air vehicle, to
a human pilot remotely controlling the vehicle, and then towards the vehicle controlling itself
autonomously, is a very popular approach. Yet it is fraught with difficulties (as discussed in
earlier sections, in particular Section 2). In the near future we expect the scope of autonomy to
be somewhat limited (medium), whereas it is possible that longer-term we will see UASs with
higher levels of autonomous functionality.
Safety criticality (of autonomous aspects): Even though we are not (yet) considering UAS that
carry human passengers, the safety criticality of UAS is very high. This is for the simple reason
that a significant malfunction might lead to a collision, either between the UAS and a ground
object (e.g. building, people), or between a UAS and another aircraft (potentially carrying pas-
sengers).
Amount of available regulation (for autonomous aspects): To provide a practical route to
certification, including for non-autonomous systems, a range of documents/standards have been
provided [177], perhaps the most relevant being the FAA documents Software Considerations
in Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification [189, 193], Formal Methods Supplement to
DO-178C and DO-278A [192], and Design Assurance Guidance for Airborne Electronic Hard-
ware [191]. These standards provide directions toward the use of formal methods in the cer-
tification of (traditional) air systems, but say relatively little about autonomous (or even semi-
autonomous) operation. The FAA has recently published official rules for non-hobbyist small
UAS operations, Part 107 of the Federal Aviation Regulations [77] that certifies remote human
operators for a broad spectrum of commercial uses of UAS weighing less than 25 kg.
Suitable verification, validation, and analysis techniques: One approach, discussed in Sec-
tion 3.3, to the analysis and potential certification of unmanned, particularly autonomous, air
systems is to begin to show that the software replacing the pilot’s capabilities effectively achieves
the levels of competence required of a human pilot. For example, if we replace the ‘flying’ ca-
pabilities of a pilot by an autopilot software component, then we must prove the abilities of
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the autopilot in a wide range of realistic flight scenarios. While this corresponds to the opera-
tional/control REACTIONS LAYER within our approach, we can also assess the decision-making
against the required rules that UAS should follow. Pilots are required to pass many tests before
being declared competent, with one such being knowledge of the ‘Rules of the Air’. In [224]
the agent making the high-level decisions in an UAS is formally verified against (a subset of)
the ‘Rules of the Air’. This type of analysis of the system’s RULES LAYER is necessary, though
not sufficient, to provide broader confidence in autonomous air systems. Human pilots possess
strong elements of ‘airmanship’ and the ability and experience to cope with unexpected and
anomalous situations. It is here that the PRINCIPLES LAYER must capture this, more complex,
decision-making. An initial attempt at the formalisation and verification of ethical decisions in
unexpected situations was undertaken in [62] wherein a simple ethical ordering of outcomes was
used to cope with situations the UAS had no expectations of, and rules about.
4.5 Self-Driving Car
Functionalities: Currently, the development of self-driving cars is one of the main innovation
factors (besides e-mobility) in the automotive industry. Advanced driver assistance functions
such as adaptive cruise control, lane keeping, or parking, are available in many cars. Combining
such driver assistance systems, a partial autonomous driving (e.g., driving on the highway for a
limited time) can be realized. Although not yet being available to end customers, cars with con-
ditional autonomy (e.g., driving on the highway for an extended distance or autonomous parking
in a parking deck) are already state of the art. Every major manufacturer has concrete plans to
bring highly automated cars to the market in the next few years, although there is some debate
as to whether these plans are feasible. Intermediate steps towards increasing autonomy include
vehicle platooning/convoying whereby vehicles commit to being part of a (linear) formation and
cede control of speed/direction to the platoon/convoy leader [212, 27, 206].
Positioning w.r.t. the layers in our reference autonomy framework: In terms of our three-
level categorisation, current ‘driverless’ cars essentially only have the lowest operational/control
REACTIONS LAYER to handle lane following, speed control, etc, while the human driver is
responsible for following the rules and regulations concerning road use and for coping with
unexpected situations or failures.
Once we move to the platoon/convoy (or ‘road train’) concept, the aim is that more of the
(developing) regulations [183] are taken by the autonomous system. Again, the human driver
will be responsible for unexpected situations and failures, and will also take over responsibility
for road use once the vehicle leaves the platoon/convoy. Thus, in this case, a RULES LAYER is
required.
However, the fully autonomous vehicles that we expect in the future will require software
to be able to handle not just operational aspects such as steering, braking, parking, etc, but
also comprehensive regulations such as the “rules of the road”. Furthermore, the PRINCIPLES
LAYER of our autonomous system must conform to some high-level requirements concerning
unexpected situations. Of course these do not exist yet, but we might expect them to at least
have some quite straightforward basic principles such as
avoid harm to humans where possible
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and
if a problem occurs, safely move to an approved parking area
Of course, many more principles/properties will surely be needed.
Level of (future) autonomy: A long-term vision is that self-driving cars are available on de-
mand. If some people need a transport service, they can call an autonomous taxi via a smart-
phone app. Thus, there is no necessity to buy and maintain one’s own car; resources are shared
between many users. For this vision to become a reality, cars must be able to drive fully au-
tonomous to any desired destination in all traffic situations, and must moreover be able to col-
laborate with the rest of the fleet to deliver an optimal service. As this vision is gradually
realised, self-driving cars will have increasing scope of autonomy (eventually high), but in the
nearer term we expect more limited scope of autonomy.
Safety criticality (of autonomous aspects): Clearly, cars have a high level of safety critical-
ity. The development of automotive software must follow functional safety standards, such as
ISO 26262.This standard also prescribes the safety requirements to be fulfilled in the design,
development and validation. For the verification and validation of software functionalities on
the REACTIONS LAYER and RULES LAYER, we regard the existing techniques and regulations
as being sufficient.
Amount of available regulation (for autonomous aspects): While there is considerable hype
suggesting that such vehicles are imminent, neither the automotive industry nor the regulators
are at the point of being able to certify their reliability or safety. Global legal constraints, such as
the Vienna Convention on Road Traffic [221], ensure that there must always be a person which
is able to control the safe operation of the vehicle. It is a current political discussion how to
amend these regulations. The US Department of Transportation has recently issued a “Federal
Automated Vehicles Policy”. It includes a 15-Point Safety Assessment, including “Testing,
validation, and verification of an HAV system”. For SAE levels 4 and 5, if the driver has handed
the control to the vehicle, liability rests with the manufacturer. Thus, most car manufacturers
follow a “trip recorder” approach: A black box specially protected against tampering is used to
collect all relevant data, and can be used to assign liability in case of an accident. However, with
current legislation liability rests on factors such as human reaction times, weather conditions, etc.
It is an open question whether these factors can be transferred to the case that an autonomous
agent is the driver instead of a human.
Suitable verification, validation, and analysis techniques: Concerning the extraction of re-
quirements and the verification of these requirements on a specific vehicle, we can see how
the operational/practical constraints will be derived from many of the existing requirements
on cruise control, lane following, etc, while we will see refined requirements for the sens-
ing/monitoring capabilities within the vehicle. Verifying all these aspects often involve a suite
of (acceptable) testing schemes. In addition, it is clear that, just as the agent controlling an au-
tonomous air vehicle can be verified with respect to the “rules of the air” (see above), the agent
controlling an autonomous road vehicle can be verified against the “rules of the road” [6].
However, when it comes to the functionalities of the PRINCIPLES LAYER, the rules that
a human driver is expected to follow need to be transformed into requirements suitable for
an autonomous agent. This will also include sensor/camera reliability and confidence in ob-
stacle/sign/pedestrian recognition, and will also feed in to risk analysis component within the
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agent. Example for such ‘PRINCIPLES LAYER rules’ are “if there is low perceived risk of colli-
sion, continue at the highest admissible speed”, and “if there is high perceived risk of collision,
or low confidence in the perceptions, then slow down”. In fully autonomous vehicles, the reli-
ability of the PRINCIPLES LAYER is a crucial aspect. It must be able to cope with unexpected
events, failures, aggressive road users, etc. Thus, the extraction of suitable requirements and
their validation is highly important.
4.6 Personal Assistant Agent
Functionalities: The now-ubiquitous personal assistant agent has origins earlier than the web
[96, 98] and became mainstream with Apple’s Siri in 2010 [28]. The vision for such a PAA
agent is proactive, personalised, contextual assistance for a human user [235]. A PAA agent is
a software entity, although the services it connects to and can command may include physical
services such as smart home devices. So far, PAAs are mainly voice-controlled assistants that
react to user requests such as looking for information on the web, checking the weather, setting
alarms, managing lights and thermostats in a smart home. Few apps classified as smart personal
assistants connect to service providers, banks, social networks; 24me is one among them: ac-
cording to its description on the web [1], “automatically tells you what you need to do and also
helps you take care of your things from within the app”. This technology moves on rapidly,
however, and Gatebox’s “Azuma Hikari” system9 promises a startling development:
“The Comforting Bride: Azuma Hikari is a bride character who develops over
time, and helps you relax after a hard day. Through day-to-day conversations with
Hikari, and her day-to-day behavior, you will be able to enjoy a lifestyle that is
more relaxed”. [https://www.gatebox.ai/en/hikari]
Positioning w.r.t. the layers in our reference autonomy framework: The REACTIONS LAYER
for a PAA consists of the PAA connecting to local and web services. The services can affect the
world and the user’s day-to-day life in both smaller and larger ways: from opening an app on a
mobile device, to reserving a table at a restaurant; from changing the temperature in the user’s
house to making a bank payment from her account. The RULES LAYER, currently only realized
in sophisticated systems, is responsible for the combination of such services, e.g., according to
user preferences (“one hour after the scheduled dinner reservation, begin heating the house”).
The PRINCIPLES LAYER would be not only responsible for exceptional and emergency circum-
stances (e.g., calling help when the human needs it), but also for giving advice in personal mat-
ters (e.g., whether to sign an insurance contract or not). The “Azuma Hikari” character has the
potential for quite an array of autonomous behaviour but, not just setting out required behaviours,
in RULES LAYER, but even providing quite sophisticated PRINCIPLES LAYER behaviours.
Level of (future) autonomy: The level and scope of autonomy are both limited so far, but we
see a huge potential for PAAs to become more and more autonomous, implementing Negro-
ponte’s vision of the agent which “answers the phone, recognizes the callers, disturbs you when
appropriate, and may even tell a white lie on your behalf. [...] If you have somebody who knows
9 https://www.gatebox.ai/en/hikari
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you well and shares much of your information, that person can act on your behalf very effec-
tively. If your secretary falls ill, it would make no difference if the temping agency could send
you Albert Einstein. This issue is not about IQ. It is shared knowledge and the practice of using
it in your best interests” [175]. Again, the “Azuma Hikari” approach provides the possibility for
quite a lot more autonomous behaviour.
Safety criticality (of autonomous aspects): Depending on what the PAA can control, it may
actually be a safety critical system: if it can make financial transactions, it might unintentionally
cause economic loss to its user; if it can send messages on behalf of, or even pretend to be its
user, it might create severe damages to professional and personal relations. Indeed, if the PAA
is given control over aspects of the user’s physical environment (such as locks on their home’s
doors), the possibilities for harm become more significant. While not safety-critical, the “Azuma
Hikari” assistant clearly has some potentially ethical issues [181] as captured in the BS8611, not
least with the anthropomorphism. If we extend our view of safety beyond physical harms to
more general psychological/ethical harms then there might well be issues here.
Amount of available regulation (for autonomous aspects): To our knowledge, there is no
regulation of PAAs, other than general consumer electronics regulation and regulations in spe-
cific sectors which co-incidentally apply to the PAA’s services such as regulations concerning
protocols for accessing banking institution services. While there is no single data protection
legislation in the US, in Europe the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR [70]) became
operative in May 2018. GDPR regulates the processing by an individual, a company or an or-
ganisation of personal data relating to individuals in the EU. A PAA based in Europe should
comply to the GDPR. As an example, it should not share information by making unauthorized
unauthorized calls on behalf of its user and should not share sensitive data (pictures, logs of
conversations, amount of money in the bank account, health records) of its user and his or her
relatives. It should also take care of where these personal data are stored to ensure an acceptable
level of protection. On the other hand, a PAA should be allowed to override privacy laws and
call emergency services if it suspects its user is unconscious from an accident, suicidal, or oth-
erwise unable to ask for help, and it should share health information with the first aid personnel.
Relating to the ethical/psychological issues above, standards such as BS8611 and the IEEE’s
P7000 series are of relevance.
Suitable verification, validation, and analysis techniques: Like any complex piece of
software, the PAA should undergo a careful testing stage before release. However, we believe
that the most suitable technique to prevent it from unsafe behaviour, is runtime verification. The
financial transactions might be monitored at runtime, and blocked as soon as their amount, or
the amount of the exchanged message, overcome a given threshold. Calls to unknown numbers
should not necessarily be blocked, as they might be needed in some emergency cases, but they
should be intercepted and immediately reported to the user. Commands to smart devices should
be prevented, if they belong to a sequence of commands meeting some dangerous pattern.
4.7 Home Assistant Robot
The situation changes if we consider home assistant robots that are not only performing simple
tasks, but also issuing medical reminders, providing simple physiotherapeutic treatment, and
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even offering ‘companionship’. Consider a robot such as the ‘Care-o-Bot’10. A number of
domestic assistants are already available. These span a range, from the above Robot Vacuum
Cleaner right up to Care-o-Bot systems, and similar systems, such as Toyota’s Human-Support
Robot Family11. We will primarily consider the more sophisticated end of this spectrum.
Functionalities: Robots such as Care-o-Bot are intended to be a general domestic assistant.
They can carry out menial cleaning/tidying tasks, but can also (potentially, given the regulatory
approval) fetch deliveries from outside the home and provide food and drink for the occupant(s)
of the house. Each such robot is typically mobile (e.g., wheels) and has at least one manipulator,
usually an ‘arm’. Yet this type of robot can potentially go further, becoming a true social robot,
interacting with the occupant(s) (e.g., what to get for lunch?) and engaging in social dialogue
(e.g., favourite TV show?). These robots (again, with appropriate approval) also have the po-
tential to measure and assess physical and psychological health. Clearly, with this wide range
of functionalities and increasing autonomy, robots of this form should be both highly-regulated
and will have many, non-trivial, decisions to make.
Positioning w.r.t. the layers in our reference autonomy framework: The need for all of
our layers is clear. Any physical interaction with the environment, or movement within a house,
will require a complex REACTIONS LAYER. Similarly, one would expect the regulatory frame-
work for such robotic systems to be quite complex and so, necessarily, the RULES LAYER will
also likely be comprehensive. In the future the combination of broad functionality, increasing
autonomy, and responsibility for health and well-being of human occupants will surely lead to
quite complex ethical issues [10, 168, 204, 49] and so to a truly non-trivial PRINCIPLES LAYER.
Level of (future) autonomy: In principle, the scope and level of autonomy can both be
high but, as noted below, the regulatory frameworks limit this at present. In the future, home
care robots might become much more than service providers. Especially with people who are
isolated and find little human contact, these robots might begin to guide and accompany their
owners, remind them to take their medicine or drink water, and even provide simple social com-
panionship (for example, asking about relatives, about the news, or about TV programmes seen
recently). Especially in these latter cases, the issue of trust is crucial [7, 205, 25], since no one
will use a robot in this way if they do not trust them. It becomes a central issue for the PRIN-
CIPLES LAYER to assess how much to build trust and how much to stay within legal/regulatory
bounds. Doing what the owner wants it to do can build trust, whereas refusing to do something
because of minor illegality erodes trust very quickly.
Safety criticality (of autonomous aspects): In addition to the various issues that apply to
Personal Assistant Agents, the broader role of Home Assistant Robots makes them more safety
critical. For instance, if medicine is administered incorrectly, or if a Home Assistant Robot
failures to raise the alarm when a human has an adverse health event, then lives may be put at
risk. Therefore, it appears that clear regulations specifically developed for such robots will be
needed, alongside standards targeting exactly the issues concerning these installations. With the
complex practical, social, and health-care potential, the range of standards needs to go beyond
physical safety and on to issues such as “ethical risk” [43].
10 http://www.care-o-bot.de
11 www.toyota-global.com/innovation/partner robot
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Amount of available regulation (for autonomous aspects): There appears to be very lit-
tle current regulation specifically designed for autonomous robotics, let alone such autonomous
domestic assistants. While there are some developing standards that have relevance, such as
ISO 13482 [140], the regulatory oversight for domestic robotic assistants is unclear. In some
cases they are treated as industrial robots, in some cases as medical devices (especially if health
monitoring is involved), and in others they are straightforwardly treated as electro-mechanical
devices. In some jurisdictions (e.g., the UK) responsibility for regulation falls to the local regu-
latory authority, whereas in others regulatory oversight is a national responsibility. Furthermore,
the standards that are appealed to are not specific standards for autonomous domestic robots, but
rather standards for software, robots, or medical appliances.
On particular challenge concerns learning new behaviours. These might be specified by
the user or might result from analytical analysis by the robot. These learned behaviours might
well be ‘new’, i.e., not part of the robot’s behaviour when initially deployed. In this case,
there should be some mechanism to assess whether the new, learned behaviour is consistent
with the prescribed regulations. However, this assessment must either take place offline, in
which case there will be some ‘down time’ for the robot, or online, in which case we will
need effective and efficient techniques for carrying out this assessment. In the case where the
human has specified/requested some new behaviour that is ‘in conflict’ with the regulations, the
PRINCIPLES LAYER becomes essential as it must make decisions about whether to employ, or
ignore, this new behaviour.
Suitable verification, validation, and analysis techniques: Ignoring the analysis of stan-
dard robot manipulation and movement aspects, there has been specific work on the analysis of
REACTIONS LAYER [230, 150] and RULES LAYER [64, 223] issues. As we would expect, the
ethical issues concerning such (potential) robots are of great interest to both philosophers and
formal methods [11, 25]. Interestingly, issues such as privacy and security are only gradually
being considered here [233]
5 Future Challenges
This section looks ahead. Based on the discussion in previous sections, it defines a number
of challenges. These are broken down into three areas, depending on the intended audience,
i.e., who are the people who could make progress on the challenge? Specifically, we consider
challenges to researchers, to engineers, and to regulators.
5.1 Research challenges
There are a number of challenges that we identify for the research community.
One group of challenges relates to the overarching question of how to extend from current
verification settings and assumptions, to the settings and assumptions required? Specific ques-
tions include:
• As described earlier (Sections 3 and 4), in various domains autonomous systems need to
perform ethical reasoning. However, how to specify the reasoning required, and perform it
5 Future Challenges 49
effectively, is still an open question, as is how to specify verification properties that relate
to such reasoning.
• In domains that involve interaction with humans, especially close interaction, such as
human-agent teams, there is a need for ways to elicit and model the capabilities and atti-
tudes (e.g., goals, beliefs) of the humans.
• Since autonomous systems, even in safety-critical situations, are increasingly likely to
make some use of Machine Learning, how can we verify such systems? If a system is able
to learn at run-time, then some sort of run-time verification will be needed, although there
may also be a role for mechanisms that limit the scope of the learning in order to ensure
that important desired properties cannot be violated.
• How can we handle larger and more complex systems (scalability of verification meth-
ods)? This includes systems with potentially not just multiple but many agents.
• Finally, how we can improve the way that we design and build systems to make them more
amenable to verification? One possible approach is to use synthesis to build systems that
are provably correct from verification artefacts.
In addition to challenges relating to extending verification to richer, and more complex, set-
tings, there are also a number of research challenges that relate to the broader social context
of verification. Perhaps most fundamentally, we need better methods for systematically iden-
tifying (i.e., deriving) properties to be verified. We have sketched (in Section 3.3) an outline
of such a process, but more work is required to flesh this out, and refine it through iterated use
and evaluation. One particular challenge is dealing with unusual situations that are particularly
hard to anticipate. Another area that poses research challenges is the possibility of using natu-
ral language processing to create structured formal (or semi-formal) requirements from textual
artefacts (which we discussed earlier, in Section 2.3.1).
There is also a big research challenge to develop ways to engineer systems that are trans-
parent, and, in particular, systems that can explain themselves to users, regulators etc. While
there is the whole subfield of explainable AI (XAI), here we highlight the particular needs of
safety-critical autonomous systems – where explainability might need to focus less on explain-
ing specific individual behaviours to users, and more on explaining how a system operates to
regulators.
5.2 Engineering challenges
We now turn to engineering challenges. These are challenges that need to be addressed to
practically engineer reliable autonomous systems, once the underlying research challenges have
been adequately addressed.
• An existing challenge that is exacerbated is the need to track assumptions and their prove-
nance, and to manage the system as it evolves (maintenance). If requirements change, and
the system is modified, how can we update the verification (as well as manuals and other
documentation)?
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• We identified research challenges relating to extending the scope and setting to deal with
ethical reasoning, and to deal with machine learning. Systems that perform ethical reason-
ing must be built; building systems that involve learning also has engineering challenges.
• A research challenge that we identified was how to model humans, for example in the
context of human-agent teamwork. There is a related engineering challenge which is how
to design systems that ‘work well’ with humans. Note this is a design challenge, not a
research challenge (there is a body of e.g., HCI research on this).
• Another research challenge was using synthesis to create provably correct systems. A
related engineering challenge is managing this process. In practical terms, even if we
have technology that can generate a system (or parts of a system) from verification arte-
facts, there are engineering challenges in managing this process, and having a meta-system
where the user clicks ‘go’ and the system is built from V&V artefacts.
• We noted above a number of research challenges that relate to the broader social context.
There are also engineering challenges that relate to this. The big one is linking verification
of design artefacts to the broader needs of stakeholders, in particular regulators. Suppose
that a software system for controlling a train is verified. How can this be used to provide
regulators with a convincing safety argument? One particular aspect is trust in the process
and tools: how do we know that the verification tools are themselves correct? (see the
discussion of regulator challenges below)
• Finally, just as there are research challenges in scaling to handle larger and more complex
systems, so too there are engineering challenges that relate to verifying large and complex
systems. These concern techniques for making effective use of computing resources (be
they traditional high-performance computing, or cloud computing) in order to effectively
verify systems, and manage this process.
Along with these challenges, we mention the difficulty that companies can have in finding
qualified engineering staff [165].
5.3 Regulatory challenges
Finally, there are challenges for regulators. A number of challenges relate to the existence of
multiple stakeholders, who may be in a complex state that combines cooperation (e.g., to cre-
ate standards) and competition. Related challenges to this include: how to manage disclosure
of information that is sensitive (e.g., industrial ‘secrets’), and how to reach consensus of in-
volved stakeholders, e.g., car OEMs. This is particularly important if autonomous systems from
different manufacturers have to collaborate, e.g., in car platooning.
More broadly, the regulatory landscape is complex, with multiple actors (governments,
courts, companies, etc.) which poses challenges around how to manage differences between
jurisdictions (or between regulators with overlapping domains of interest). If autonomous sys-
tems operate in different countries, they should comply to all national regulations of the involved
countries. However, the legal requirements may differ, and even contradict each other. Here,
multi-national agreements and treaties are necessary.
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When we consider any form of ethical reasoning done by autonomous systems, then there
is a challenge in how to obtain sufficient agreement amongst various stakeholders (e.g., gov-
ernment, civil society, manufacturers) about the specification of what is appropriate ethical be-
haviour, or even a clear delineation distinguishing between behaviour that is clearly considered
ethical, behaviour that is clearly considered unethical, and behaviour where there is not a clear
consensus, or where it depends on the underlying ethical principles and framework.
A related point is the legal notion of responsibility, which is a question for regulators, and
for society more broadly in the form of governments and legal systems; see for instance [89] for
an introduction.
Finally, as mentioned above, there are challenges in trusting tools and processes themselves.
How can the verification tools be trusted? [210] To what extent can they be verified? [194].
6 Conclusion
Autonomous systems have great potential to transform our world. The substantial adoption of
even just one type of autonomous system — self-driving cars — will substantially alter passen-
ger transport and the geography of cities (e.g., enhancing mobility for those who cannot drive,
and reducing the need for parking spaces). More fundamentally, autonomous systems change
our relationship with technology, as technology and human society reach an “intimate entangle-
ment” [83]. However, ensuring that autonomous systems are fit-for-purpose, especially when
their function is in any way safety-critical, is crucial for their adoption. This article therefore
addressed the fundamental question: “How can the reliability of an autonomous software system
be ensured?”
After reviewing the state-of-the-art, including standards, existing approaches for certifica-
tion, and open issues, this article proposed a way forward towards a framework for certification
of safety-critical autonomous systems. We presented a three-layer framework for structuring
such systems, gave an indication of what is needed from regulators, and outlined a process for
identifying requirements. We reviewed a range of verification techniques, considering their ap-
plicability, strengths and weaknesses with respect to autonomous systems, and illustrated the
application of our framework in seven diverse application scenarios. Finally, in order to help
move towards a detailed and usable framework for certification, we articulated a range of chal-
lenges for researchers, for engineers, and for regulators.
In addition to the specific challenges discussed in the previous section, there are also a num-
ber of other questions arising from the emergence of autonomous systems. These are cross-
cutting, in that they pose challenges to all of the key stakeholders (researchers, engineers, and
regulators).
• How to deal with tacit knowledge, e.g., where humans learn by “feel” (e.g. pilots)? Should
each individual autonomous system learn, or should the knowledge evolve in a popula-
tion?
• How to deal with security challenges, in particular, if the autonomous system cannot be
continually supervised? Should an autonomous system have “self-defence” capabilities
against humans?
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• How to deal with Quality of Service (QoS) requirements, in particular, for a large group
of autonomous systems and many users?
• How to deal with varying interpretations, inconsistent requirements, and missing context?
• How to deal with contradicting requirements from different stakeholders? Is there a notion
of “loyalty” for autonomous systems?
• How to deal with changing standards, attitudes, morals?
We hope that the initial framework, and the specific challenges, can form a map in guid-
ing the various communities along the path towards a framework for certification of reliable
autonomous systems.
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